Keep your friends close and at a distance : studying the structural network properties of a regional cluster and it’s broader ecosystem through social network analysis by Conradsen, Kari Sofie Mysen & Hartvig-Larsen, Max
 
 
Keep your friends close and at a 
distance   
Studying the structural network properties of a regional cluster 
and it’s broader ecosystem through social network analysis  
Kari Sofie Mysen Conradsen and Max Hartvig-Larsen 
Supervisor: Ivan Belik  
Co-supervisor: Eirik Sjåholm Knudsen 
Master Thesis, Economics and Business Administration 
Majors: Strategy and Management & Business Analytics 




This thesis was written as a part of the Master of Science in Economics and Business 
Administration at NHH. Please note that neither the institution nor the examiners are 
responsible − through the approval of this thesis − for the theories and methods used, or results 
and conclusions drawn in this work. 
Norwegian School of Economics  
Bergen, Fall 2020  
 
 2
Acknowledgement   
 
We would like to begin by thanking our supervisor Ivan Belik, and co-supervisor Eirik 
Sjåholm Knudsen. Your guidance and constructive feedback on our work has been excellent. 
Especially your passion and enthusiasm for social network analysis, regional clusters, and 
fintech has been truly inspirational, both in terms of choice of topic and during more intense 
periods of finalizing this thesis. 
Furthermore, we would like to thank the people that participated in our survey on behalf of 
actors in the Norwegian fintech community. Without you, this master thesis would not have 
been realizable. A special thanks to Atle Sivertsen, CEO of NCE Finance Innovation, for 
supporting us with the data collection. We look forward to witnessing the evolution of fintech 
in Norway in the years to come. A warm thanks to our friends and family for all your support. 
Lastly, we would like to thank NHH and the Student Association for five educational and 
memorable years. We will value all our strong and weak ties with students, professors, 
businesses representatives and others in the years to come. 
  
 3 
Abstract   
 
Regional clusters and ecosystems are increasingly becoming an important part of 
many organizations’ and countries’ strategies for innovation and economic growth. In the 
context of the Norwegian fintech industry, this thesis aims to investigate the structural 
characteristics of the networks of interfirm relations that make up a regional cluster and the 
broader ecosystems which it is embedded. This was accomplished by collecting data through 
an electronic survey on the relations of both members and non-members of the regional cluster 
NCE Finance Innovation and analysing these relations through the lens of social network 
analysis (SNA). Our results indicate that the regional cluster members to a large extent have 
relations outside the regional cluster’s boundaries. Moreover, the regional cluster 
network exhibits hierarchical properties, where a few actors are significantly more connected, 
and therefore potentially important for the network’s ability to diffuse information and 
knowledge. We found that traditional financial institutions are highly central with regards to 
every used centrality measure, which might suggest that the firm-specific characteristics 
of cluster members to a degree can explain their level of connectedness.  Our findings suggest 
that SNA can be a valuable tool for researchers, cluster facilitators and policy 
makers by exposing detailed information about the network properties of a regional cluster, 
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Our understanding of the nature of the firm has evolved considerably from when Ronald Coase 
(1937)  first suggested that firms are not “black boxes”, but alternative means for organizing 
similar kinds of transactions as markets. The old idea was that a firm’s boundaries excluded 
everything that was not legally a part of that firm. Everything outside this sphere was seen as 
the firm’s environment, and it was thought that the firm could not change it. Today there is 
consensus that firms can and do in fact shape their external surroundings by forming 
relationships.  
Network-thinking has in recent years gained momentum as it has shown to be positively 
correlated with learning and innovation (Gausdal 2008; Handel & Powell 1990). The attention 
towards what drives innovation has developed from focusing on the resources held inside firms 
to increasingly encompass networks of businesses, such as regional clusters and ecosystems 
(Gausdal, 2008). A regional cluster holds many definitions and is in theory and practice also 
referred to as a “business cluster”, a “cluster of innovation”, or simply a “cluster” (Doeringer 
& Terkla, 1995; Engel, 2015; Porter, 1990). Nonetheless, common themes in most definitions 
are that regional clusters are made up of organizations that are geographically grouped together 
and operate in common fields or related industries. These organizations interact and are 
interconnected through a wide range of relationships, such as customers, competitors, 
providers and financing partners. The term “ecosystem”, which is borrowed from biology, has 
many applications in different contexts but can in simple terms be defined as “a group of 
interacting firms that depend on each other’s activities” (Jacobides et al., 2018). This thesis 
simply refers to an ecosystem as the broader community of loosely connected networks in 
which a regional cluster is embedded.  
There is wide consensus in research that networks of actors organized in social systems such 
as regional clusters and ecosystems can be advantageous for innovation and learning. 
However, research on these topics rarely apply objective analytical methods for accurately 
obtaining and analysing intricate details about the nature and strength of the interfirm relations 
in these networks (see for example, de Man & Duysters, 2005; Santamaría & Nieto; Schilling 
& Phelps, 2007). In addition, a detailed understanding of how the structural properties of 
networks affect innovation, is an under-researched topic (Amara & Landry, 2005). For 
example, Rosenfeld (1997) argues that significant, but often overlooked factors for indicating 
a regional cluster’s synergies and growth prospects are the efficiency of the “flows” of 
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information, and the intensity of cooperation and information sharing, which indicates the 
level of social capital and trust in a cluster. Giuliani & Pietrobelli (2011) argues that the 
methods for evaluating clusters by studying their network-properties are still in their infancy. 
One reason might be that there is no clear consensus on how to measure the connectivity and 
other insightful properties of a regional cluster’s network structure accurately and 
unbiasedly. In addition, as research suggest that regional clusters are not self-sufficient with 
regard to the knowledge they draw upon (Gertler & Wolfe, 2004), research might benefit from 
examining in greater detail how regional clusters are embedded in a larger ecosystem, and how 
the degree of connectedness to this external environment might affect local innovation in a 
regional cluster (see for example, Turkina & Van Assche, 2018).  
The purpose of this thesis is to add to these gaps in the literature, by studying the structural 
network characteristics of a regional cluster through the lens of social network analysis (SNA). 
More specifically, we map and analyse the structural properties of the networks of a regional 
cluster to study i) how it differs from the network characteristics of the broader ecosystem-
network which it is nested, ii) how it corresponds to network characteristics that prior research 
has highlighted as beneficial/detrimental for innovation, and iii) how influence is distributed 
among the regional cluster members.  
Our empirical setting is the Norwegian fintech ecosystem, and the regional cluster NCE 
Finance Innovation (NCE FI) that was established in Bergen in 2017. To collect our data, we 
distributed a survey to 104 Norwegian fintech firms where we asked them to list their most 
important relations within different relational categories. From this, we generated a rich 
network of the Norwegian fintech ecosystem, which encompassed both firms within and 
outside of NCE FI. During our analysis, we analysed the structural characteristics of the 
network of the members of NCE FI, referred to in this thesis as the regional cluster network, 
and compared and contrasted it with the larger network that also encompassed firms that were 
not formal members of this regional cluster, referred to as the organic network. The combined 
relations in both networks is referred to as the maximum network.  
To map and analyse these networks, we used the graph-theoretical toolkit known as social 
network analysis. We use SNA because it can be a valuable tool for analysing and evaluating 
regional clusters as it exposes detailed information about a cluster’s network that through 
conventional methods would otherwise remain invisible. SNA can provide profound insights 
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into a network’s properties affecting its ability to innovate, such as the distribution of influence 
and power, critical roles, and how efficient information flows. 
Several interesting results emerged from our analysis. We found that most of the regional 
cluster members’ important relations exist with actors outside the boundary of the regional 
cluster, indicating a broad Norwegian fintech ecosystem. We found that these boundary 
spanning relations might be beneficial for the regional cluster’s ability to innovate by enabling 
access to diverse, non-redundant knowledge from its outside environment. From studying the 
structural characteristics of the regional cluster’s network and comparing it with the organic 
network, we found that the regional cluster shows potential for efficient flow of information 
between the actors, but that it might benefit from strengthening relations within the network, 
which could create an environment of potentially more trustful relations, better suited to 
combine and take advantage of novel ideas stemming from the external environment. In 
addition, we found that the regional cluster network exhibits properties of a hierarchical 
network where a few actors are highly central and influential compared to the rest of the cluster 
members. These actors, mostly consisting of traditional financial institutions and consulting 
firms are seemingly vital to the network as they facilitate the flow of information to the less 
central actors. These few, highly central actors may constitute a significant vulnerability, as 
their absence could fragment the network into unconnected subgroups, limiting the flow of 
knowledge across the network. Our findings also suggest that the most influential actors 
subjectively perceive that they attain more innovative capabilities from being embedded in the 
regional cluster than less influential actors.  
We believe our thesis contributes to both research and practice. For research, we make at least 
three contributions. First, our findings suggest that social network analysis can be a useful tool 
for researchers as it enables deeper insights into the structural characteristics of regional 
clusters and allows for detailed analysis of the implications of these structural characteristics. 
Moreover, our findings support existing research by suggesting that regional clusters are not 
isolated systems disconnected from their external environment, and that the way a regional 
cluster is embedded in the larger ecosystem might matter for its ability to facilitate innovation 
locally. Furthermore, our findings suggest that the attributes of the cluster members could 
matter in terms of how relations form in a regional cluster, and therefore that the resources 
held inside firms could be important for explaining and predicting an actor’s level of 
connectedness and influence in a regional cluster.  
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For practice, the insights from this thesis can be used by facilitators and policymakers, to 
evaluate and potentially steer a regional cluster’s development trajectory by applying efficient 
mechanisms, incentives and policies that facilitate favourable alterations of a regional cluster’s 
network structures.  
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2. Literary review 
This chapter presents important themes in research on networks, regional clusters, and social 
network analysis. In the first part, we introduce early research on networks as distinct social 
forms of economic action. Next, the phenomena of regional clusters, its definitions, 
advantages, and limitations will be explained. Consecutively, basic assumptions and central 
aspects of social network analysis will be presented. Finally, research on the impacts of various 
network structures and actors’ positioning in networks will be explained, before five 
propositions of what we expect to find from our analysis will be presented.  
2.1 Early research on networks 
Research on organizational networks can be traced back to Granovetter (1985) who studied 
social embeddedness of economic action, where he emphasized the importance of social ties 
that organizations use to manage their mutual dependencies. Organizations jointly navigate 
their environments containing interdependencies across markets, resources or technologies 
that are, at least partly, under control of other organizations (Astley & Fombrun, 1983). 
Organizations can thereby improve their performance by interacting with other organizations 
that have complementary resources, technologies, or market access (Shipilov & Gawer, 2020).  
Early network researchers were interested in explaining how interorganizational 
interdependencies are managed within formal relationships, such as alliances and joint 
ventures. Importantly, they found that beneath these formal relationships there are a variety of 
informal coordinating mechanisms such as trust, reciprocity, fine grained information transfer 
and joint problem-solving arrangements (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1996). Granovetter (1985) 
argued that transaction costs could be kept to a minimum as the social relations in a network 
would monitor and sanction opportunistic behaviour.  
The work of Handel & Powell (2003) helped develop the concept of “network form” and   
argued that interfirm cooperation generates incentives for mutual learning, trust, reciprocity, 
and the spreading of information among independent organizations. In the complex array of 
economic relations that exist today, the exchange of commodities whose value cannot be easily 
measured such as know-how, knowledge, innovation, and technological capabilities are more 
likely to take place in networks than in markets. In addition, networks are especially suitable 
for dynamic environments where competition is based on factors such as the ability to innovate 
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and translate ideas to new products quickly, and where there is a need for efficient, reliable 
information (Handel & Powell, 2003). 
The term “innovation” is complex and holds many definitions, but a practical and simple 
definition is “the introduction of new things, ideas or ways of doing something” (Oxford 
University Press, 2020). Innovation can be further divided into a variety of subcategories, such 
as process innovation (e.g., finding novel ways to improve production processes),  product 
innovation (e.g., development of a new product), incremental innovation (e.g., gradual 
improvements on existing products), and radical innovation (e.g., revolutionary technological 
breakthroughs).   
One reason why networks have shown to have a positive effect on innovation might be 
explained by the fast growing offering of services in our economy (Gausdal, 2008). Research 
has shown that process innovation is, to a larger degree than product innovation, dependent 
on abstract, tacit and context dependent knowledge (Newell, Robertson, Scarbrough, & Swan, 
2002) Because this type of knowledge can only be shared through interaction, the development 
of social relations and participation in social networks proves to have a positive effect on 
innovation (Hansen, Nohira, & Tierney, 1999). 
2.2 Regional clusters 
Insights from early research on networks such as the works of Handel & Powell (1990) and 
Granovetter (1985) can perhaps to some degree explain the growth and success of regional 
clusters, which in recent years have been appearing in dynamic, technology- intensive 
environments where innovation among the embedded firms to a large extent depend on their 
ability to use external knowledge. As such, regional clusters have gained much popularity both 
in theory and practice due to the realization that in modern economies, firms embedded in 
social systems where relations are based on trust, mutual learning, and joint problem-solving, 
attain benefits isolated firms do not.  
Following Porter (1998), a regional cluster can be defined as a “geographic concentration of 
interconnected companies and associated institutions in a particular field, linked by 
commonalities and complementarities” (Rocha, 2004; Wennberg & Lindqvist, 2010). The 
term “interconnected” suggests that clusters can be viewed as geographically limited 
networks, containing various types of entities that have some form of relation with one 
another. However, there is no single definition of a regional cluster, as the concept can be a 
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subject of multiple interpretations (Martin & Sunley, 2003). Regional clusters are for example 
often characterised as regional networks, which underpins the premise that network is an 
inherent part of the concept.  
Many empirical studies have shown that regional clusters are efficient in promoting 
entrepreneurship, innovation, and job creation (Delgado, Porter, & Stern, 2014). According to 
Rosenfeld (1997), being in close proximity to suppliers, complementors, customers, and 
competitors reduces transaction costs, makes it easier to resolve problems efficiently, and 
increases early learning about innovative technologies and practices. Firms co-located with 
similar and related companies also provide the advantage of boosting collective learning 
processes through frequent opportunities for formal and informal exchanges (Maskell & 
Malmberg, 1999). Porter (1998) argued that geographical proximity makes repeated personal 
interaction easier, which in turn increases trustful relations which facilitates the flow of tacit 
knowledge. Trust is, according to (Lorenz, 1996), essential for innovative collaboration. 
Research also illuminates the difficulties and potential pitfalls of embeddedness in networks 
such as regional clusters. Some argue that participation in regional clusters is time consuming 
and that many are of symbolic character, without particular activities or content (Inkpen, 
1996). Others focus on the pitfalls of strong relations due to increased demand on resources, 
and potential “lock-in” effects that hinder inflow of new information (Grabher, 1993). 
Research also indicates that even though the potential for learning in networks is significant, 
it is difficult to predict the outcome or “rewards” of investing in networks (Lawson & Lorenz, 
1999). Moreover, regional clusters as social systems can be designed or organically developed, 
and research indicates that organic networks are more robust and better at promoting 
innovation than externally designed networks (Checkland, 1999; Gausdal, 2008).  
Since the 1990’s, interest in the development and improvement of regional clusters has gained 
significant traction in policy making as a means to stimulate economic growth. Many cluster 
initiatives involve collaboration between private and public actors and involve a broad range 
of activities such as institutional building, supply chain development, strengthening key 
organizations, and providing infrastructure facilities. Creating and strengthening networks, 
however, seems to be a common factor in many cluster initiatives (Giuliani & Pietrobelli, 
2011). Porter (2000) argues that regional clusters’ interfirm relations are more important to 
productivity growth than the characteristics of the individual firms. He also states that the mere 
presence of a cluster does not guarantee functioning relations, as many of a cluster’s benefits 
are based on personal relationships that facilitate relations, foster open communication, and 
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build trust. Therefore, facilitators must ensure efficient and regular communication. Rosenfeld 
(1997) argues that an important, but often dismissed factor in explaining a cluster’s success is 
the “current”, or the flow of information, innovations, and technological knowledge. He 
therefore states that initiatives seeking to improve the productivity of regional clusters should 
focus on understanding the often intangible mechanisms by which information, capital and 
innovation move through the system, as it can enable governments and facilitators to remove 
bottlenecks and improve flows.  
Despite considerable research on the advantages and limitations of regional clusters, and how 
to improve their productivity, much research lacks analytical methods for acquiring detailed 
knowledge on the nature and strength of the interfirm relations. In addition, there is limited 
research on how such detailed insights can contribute to the understanding of potential 
limitations to innovation in regional clusters and embedded firms (see for example, de Man & 
Duysters, 2005; Santamaría & Nieto, 2007; Schilling & Phelps, 2007). According to Amara 
and Landry (2005), understanding the impact of networks remains an under-researched topic, 
such as what type of networks favour innovation. Moreover, even though cluster policies have 
put great emphasis on networks as a way of stimulating learning and innovation, there is a lack 
of analytical emphasis in the approach of studying their impacts (Giuliani & Pietrobelli, 2011). 
One reason might be that there is a lack of knowledge on how to measure connectivity other 
than through loose and irregular indicators. For example, some might consider the mere 
participation in a regional cluster as a networking process, without taking into consideration 
the nature and strength of the existing relations (Aragón et al., 2009). 
Based on the above, an objective, analytical tool which can be used to analyse and evaluate 
the nature and strength of relations between actors in a regional cluster can therefore provide 
important insights that can potentially enrich research on clusters. The next section will present 
basic assumptions and central aspects of social network analysis, to more fully understand 
how it can be applied to study interfirm relations in a regional cluster.  
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2.3 Social Network Analysis  
Social network analysis can be described as a graph-theoretic toolkit which is used to analyse 
the patterns and implications of social relations which exists among various entities 
(Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Graph theory is a mathematical discipline that arose in the 18th 
century and has been applied by social science since the start of the 20th century (Newman, 
2003). Researchers argue that SNA is not a formal theory, but an analytical tool or 
methodology, used for mapping and measuring relationships among social entities, such as 
individuals, organizations, or other social units (Marin & Wellman, 2010). Based on graph 
theory’s mathematical applications, SNA enables relationships to be represented and 
described systematically and compactly (Scott, 2013; Hanneman & Riddle, 2005) and can be 
compared to an “organizational X-ray”-tool, as it illuminates aspects of a network which other 
methodologies  cannot (Serrat, 2009). SNA uses empirical data together with computational 
models to identify, and often visualize, influential actors, communities and flows of 
information in a network, among many other tasks. According to Mohr (2014), SNA metrics 
provide an unbiased way of interpreting relationships. This can be considered a significant 
strength of SNA, as it can provide precise objective measures which makes it an applicable 
tool for researchers studying networks. 
To understand how SNA can be used as a tool to acquire deeper insights into interfirm relations 
within a regional cluster one must first get a grip of the basic assumptions of social networks. 
Social networks, or sometimes just networks, can be defined as “a set of nodes that are tied by 
one or more types of relations” (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). Nodes, or network actors, are 
the units that are connected by the patterns we study (Marin & Wellman, 2010). Most often, 
the nodes we study are persons or organizations, but in principle nodes can be any unit that 
can be connected to other units, such as web pages, countries, and firm-departments. The 
relations, in SNA called ties or edges, linking these nodes together, can be in the form of 
collaboration, friendship, information flow, or any other possible connection (Wasserman and 
Faust, 1994). SNA’s defining feature is its focus on the structure and strength of the 
relationships or bonds that bind these nodes together. Ties can therefore be weighted, meaning 
that the relations in a network differ in terms of intensity or strength, which can provide deeper 
insights into the relations of interest. Importantly, ties in a network interconnect through shared 
endpoints that also indirectly link nodes that are not directly connected. The pattern of ties in 
a network therefore creates a particular structure which can, when analysed, yield insights into 
strengths and weaknesses of a network in different contexts (Borgatti & Halgin, 2011). 
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Central aspects in social network analysis 
Social networks play a critical role as a means of spreading information, ideas, resources, and 
influence among members (Kempe, Kleinberg, & Tardos, 2003; Lea, Yu, Maguluru, & 
Nichols, 2006).  Essential assumptions of research on social networks are 1) that exchange is 
embedded in social relations and complex social structures, 2) that relationships do not occur 
in isolation, and 3) that relationships matter in terms of outcomes at both actor and group levels 
(Kilduff & Brass, 2010; Kurt & Kurt, 2020). 
One important principle of social network analysis is that environments, attributes, or 
circumstances do not affect actors independently. Social network analysts propose that 
causation is not solely located in the individual, but in the social structure (Marin & Wellman, 
2010). According to Marin and Wellman (2010), “SNA’s essential premise is that the social 
world and actors within it are created and shaped by relationships and patterns formed by 
these relationships”. It perceives the social world in terms of interactions, rather than the 
aggregation of entities acting independently, and the patterns of these relations are the units of 
analysis (Kurt & Kurt, 2020). In other words, SNA assumes that the relationships of interacting 
actors are essential to explain their nature, behaviour, and outputs (Giuliani & Pietrobelli, 
2011). This is the foundation of network theory, which refers to the processes and mechanisms 
that interact with network structures to produce certain outcomes for individuals or groups. 
Important contributors to network theory are Granovetter (1973), who found that weak ties 
were important as they provide access to novel resources, and Burt (1992) who argued that 
individuals hold certain positional advantages or disadvantages from how they are embedded 
in social structures. These perspectives are fundamentally different from individualist and 
attribute-based methodologies often used to describe an actor’s behaviour and outcomes. 
Thus, and importantly for this thesis, we assume that the nature and structure of the relations 
between organizations, such as actors in a regional cluster, matter in terms of behaviour and 
outcome. Accordingly, the focus for this thesis is not on the specific firm’s skills and 
characteristics as the source of their ability to innovate, but on the idea that innovation is a 
result of the effectiveness in which firms can gain access to external sources of assets such as 
knowledge and valuable information (Kline & Rosenberg, 1986; Kogut, 1988). 
Another important aspect of SNA deals with how to measure the different properties of 
networks. This is called network measurement and relies on mathematical representation of 
network concepts. Measures in SNA are the metrics in which networks and the actors in it can 
be assessed and compared. This allows analysts to provide more precise representations of 
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social science concepts such as “power”, “influence” or “strength of connection”. This makes 
it possible to predict for example why some organizations are successful, and others are not. 
Some of the most common and useful measures which have been used in our analysis will be 
presented in the following section.  
2.4 Measuring the properties of a network 
This section will investigate how SNA can provide detailed insights into a network’s structural 
properties and positioning of individual actors. More specifically, we will discuss why it can 
be beneficial to unravel the structure of a network and actors’ positions in these networks, and 
how this can be achieved by applying distinct analytical network measures. One can use SNA 
to measure network properties at multiple levels of analysis. To start, the focus will be on 
measuring properties applicable to the network as a whole. Subsequently, measures related to 
the properties of the individual actors at the node level of analysis will be presented.  
2.4.1 Implications from how a network is structured  
An important insight from Newman (2003) is that real networks are non-random, meaning that 
there are possible mechanisms that could be guiding the formation of networks, and therefore 
that one can exploit the network structure to achieve certain aims. The non-randomness also 
implies that the structure reflects an actor’s strategies and purposeful choices, meaning that 
the structure of the network depends on the individual’s choice of whom to connect with. 
However, one can assume that most actors in networks most likely have little knowledge on 
how their choices of connectivity affect the global network structure (Watts, 2004; Giuliani & 
Pietrobelli, 2011). 
This makes the study of the entire structure important for analysts of networks, as this for 
example allows them to identify which actors that are most likely to generate disrupting effects 
to the network. Before we identify strengths and weaknesses of common types of network 
structures, we will first introduce some of the most commonly used and robust measures used 
to quantify important aspects of networks.  
Network Density 
The density of a network is defined as the number of existing ties relative to the number of 
potential ties between any two pairs of nodes. This measure can vary from 0 to 1, and a 
completely dense network implies that each node in the network has a relation to all other 
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nodes. This measure provides insight into how connected the network actually is, in 
comparison to how connected it could potentially be. Analysts studying regional clusters often 
rely on the network density-measure as the primary indicator of the cluster’s health and 
functionality. There is, however, a common misunderstanding that sparsely connected 
networks necessarily are weak and non-functioning, and vice versa. As such, one might 
overlook that different network structures can reveal different types of collective advantages 
and disadvantages of the network of interest (Giuliani & Pietrobelli, 2011).  
The calculation of density differs for undirected and directed networks. In undirected 
networks, the tie between two nodes has no particular direction. This means that a tie from 
fintech actor 𝑖 to 𝑗 in a network is considered the same as the tie from 𝑗 to 𝑖 (Scott, 2000). 
Thus, the calculation of total possible ties for an undirected network is half of the total number 
of possible ties, 𝑛(𝑛 − 1)/2, where 𝑛 is the number of nodes in the network (Wasserman & 
Faust, 1994). The formula for network density in undirected networks, where 𝑙 is the number 
of existing ties is: 




For directed networks however, the direction of the tie is taken into consideration and 
visualized in graph networks with an arrow pointing from the source node to the target node, 
indicating the direction of the relationship. The total number of possible ties in directed 
networks is therefore 𝑛(𝑛 − 1). The formula for network density in a directed network is: 




Average path length 
Average path length is defined as the average number of steps across the shortest paths for all 
possible pairs of network nodes (Barabasi & Albert, 1999). In large networks, most nodes are 
linked together indirectly, requiring information to flow through intermediaries in order to 
reach another node.  This measure is insightful for analysis of networks, as it indicates the 
distance information must flow in average in order to reach any node in the network. The more 
actors that can be reached by any path from a given actor, the more knowledge that firm can 
potentially access (Schilling & Phelps, 2007). According to Watts (1999) the diffusion of 
information and knowledge happens faster and with more integrity in networks with short 
average path lengths. Therefore, average path length is an indication of the network’s 
efficiency of information-flow, as a large number of firms can reach more information quickly 
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and with less risk of information distortion. The calculation of average path length in a 
network is the following: 
(3)  𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ =  
1
𝑛(𝑛 − 1)
∗  ∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑗
𝑖≠𝑗
 
The number of nodes in the network is represented by 𝑛. The shortest path between node 𝑖 and 
𝑗 is denoted by 𝑑𝑖𝑗.  
Clustering coefficient 
The clustering coefficient is a measure of the tendency of nodes in a network to cluster together 
(Jackson, 2008). The global version gives an overall indication of the clustering in the network, 
while the local version indicates the embeddedness of individual nodes. A firm’s clustering 
coefficient can be computed as the proportion of its connections that are themselves directly 
linked to each other. A relatively high global value indicates that actors in a network are 
connected well locally, meaning that the network has dense subgroups. Having information 
on the degree of clustering in a network is valuable as high clustering signals a higher 
information transmission capacity of the network, as information introduced in a cluster will 
quickly reach other firms in the cluster. As there are many pathways this information can flow 
in a dense subgroup, the fidelity of information increases as firms can compare the piece of 
information from multiple partners (Schilling & Phelps, 2007). High local connectivity is 
important for the emergence of trustful relations and reciprocity norms, which in turn increase 
the flow of high-quality knowledge, such as tacit and proprietary knowledge (Giuliani & 
Pietrobelli, 2011). Networks characterised by having a high global clustering coefficient can 
make firms more willing and able to share information (Ahuja, 2000) which can lead to more 
effective joint problem- solving and the reduction of transaction costs. The reason being that 
this type of network has a strong implicit governing mechanism as the dense subgroups 
reduces both information asymmetries and uncertainty in the interaction between two actors 
(Coleman, 1988).    
The calculation of the global clustering coefficient is based on triplets of nodes, where a triplet 
is formed by three connected nodes (Jackson, 2008). In an open triplet, three nodes are 
connected by two ties, while in a closed triplet the nodes are connected by three ties. The 
global clustering coefficient for a network can be calculated by dividing the number of closed 
triplets over the number of all triplets (open and closed). The formula for undirected networks 
is the following:  
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Where two edges, such as (𝑖, 𝑗) and (𝑖, 𝑘), from the same node 𝑖 examines the frequency of 
how often (𝑗, 𝑘) also is represented in the network (Jackson, 2008).  
 
Characteristics of common network structures  
Identifying similarities and differences to structural properties found in many real-world 
networks can give useful indications of the strengths and vulnerabilities of the network being 
analysed.  
Cliques 
One of the most common interests of network analysis is identifying subgroups of actors that 
show higher average connectivity to each other than with the rest of the network’s actors. This 
phenomenon is often referred to as cohesive subgroups or cliques (Giuliani & Pietrobelli, 
2011). According to Wasserman and Faust (1994) cliques have relatively strong, intense, 
frequent or positive ties. Cliques are defined by Luce and Perry (1949) as “groups of at least 
three actors that are all connected to each other”. This means that they create a dense 
substructure of the network where all actors are connected to each other. The local clustering 
coefficient, as mentioned in the previous paragraph, is closely related to the concept of cliques 
as it quantifies how close a node’s neighbours are to being a clique.  
Networks that are characterised by cliquish substructures can, given high local connectivity, 
be expected to show the same benefits as networks having a high global clustering coefficient. 
Thus, the advantages of cliques are that they facilitate a cooperative environment, where social 
monitoring, trust and resource sharing are likely to emerge, creating an environment for 
innovation. In addition, cliques are by definition non-hierarchical networks where resources 
are distributed in an egalitarian way. Zaheer and Bell (2005) found that actors who have dense 
connections to their alters acquire more innovative capabilities, because it deepens their 
understanding of a particular innovation. Alters are the nodes whom the focal node is directly 
connected to, often referred to as the focal node’s neighbourhood. On the downside, too 
closely embedded firms can be detrimental to a firm’s innovative capabilities, because the too 
strong internal cohesion can cause the information and knowledge shared to become 
homogenous and redundant (Burt, 1992; Granovetter, 1973). The actors can get “trapped in 
their own net” (Gargiulo & Benassi, 2000) because of relational inertia. This means that the 
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firm’s relations over time will get too sticky, leading the firm to only rely on information from 
its trusted alters, therefore generating a risk of negative technological “lock-in”. This will, in 
turn inhibit innovation performance (Giuliani, 2008).  
Identifying cliques is also an important part of understanding how the network as a whole is 
likely to behave. In a network where the cliques overlap, one can expect that information 
occurring locally spread over the entire network. However, when they do not overlap, 
emergent knowledge and innovation taking place in one part of the network may not diffuse 
into other parts of the network. In addition, Giuliani & Pietrobelli (2011) points out that 
completely cohesive networks rarely occur in the real world. Most networks are fragmented 
and often formed by many smaller and non-overlapping cliquish structures. Identifying cliques 
can thereby predict both opportunities and constraints for different groups of actors, and for 
the network as a whole. 
Small-world 
Small-world networks are characterised by local cliques connected to each other by sparse or 
weak ties. The famous Harvard experiment of “small-world”, often known as “six degrees of 
separation”, conducted by Stanley Milgram in the late 1960’s was further developed by Watts 
and Strogatz (1998) into a mathematical model for describing large networks with small-world 
properties. The model’s core properties are high local density, meaning that the neighbours 
are densely connected to each other, and that there are few connections with other distant 
actors, implying that the ties connect different cliques to each other. Small-world structures 
are often characterised by having a high global clustering coefficient and short average path 
length (Giuliani & Pietrobelli, 2011). 
Despite the overall low density of ties, these networks are efficient because actors are linked 
to each other by a relatively small number of intermediaries, lowering the distance the 
information has to flow to get to actors. Baum et.al (2003) states that small-worlds are efficient 
“in moving information, innovations, routines, experience and other resources that enable 
learning, adaptation and competitive advantage”. Another benefit is the high level of local 
trust, cooperative environment, mental models and shared consensus enabled by the high 
density of local cliques. Furthermore, it ensures that local cohesive groups are not isolated, but 
connected to distant actors through a few local clique-members. Baum et. al (2003) propose 
that business organizations strategically and deliberately form distant ties in search of 
competitive advantage. This structure is nonetheless highly dependent on the brokers between 
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local and distant cliques, and thus constituting a vulnerability if these actors were to leave the 
network (Giuliani & Pietrobelli, 2011). 
Core-periphery  
Another type of network structure is core-periphery, which is composed of a tightly connected 
core, such as a dense, cohesive subgroup, and peripheral group of actors that is poorly 
connected to the dense core and each other (Borgatti & Everett, 1999). The core actors have 
the advantage of being part of a central group and can sometimes constitute an “elite” as 
opposed to the peripheral actors. This structure can be identified by visually inspecting the 
network and seeing if the most connected actors are located in the core of the network. 
Research on wine clusters in Chile has shown that in such networks, only the actors that were 
a part of the core had a high absorptive capacity, while the peripheral actors were only 
marginally included in the knowledge generating networks, indicating that their position was 
hampering their innovation and learning capabilities (Giuliani & Bell, 2005). This hierarchical 
type of network may generate and sustain a divide between network actors, and can in a 
regional cluster-context, thus hamper the overall productivity and long-term vitality of the 
network.  
Scale-free 
The network structure known as scale-free networks is inherently hierarchical and has been 
found to represent many real-world networks (Barabasi & Albert, 1999). It is called scale-free 
because the distribution of the number of direct contacts an actor in this network has, i.e., the 
degree centrality distribution, is right skewed with a heavy tail. This means that the majority 
of actors have a low average degree of connection, and that a small fraction of actors has many 
times the connections than what is average (Giuliani & Pietrobelli, 2011). These heavily 
connected actors are usually called “hubs”. The suggested mechanisms creating these kinds of 
networks are population growth and preferential attachment (de Solla Price, 1976). As actors 
join the network, it grows, and the mechanism of preferential attachments means that new 
actors are more likely to form connections with actors that are already well connected. This 
can be explained by the fact that new actors usually lack information about which actors to 
connect to. Gould (2002) explains that thorough quality judgements are costly, and new 
entrants will therefore tend to connect to highly reputable actors. Actors generate a favourable 
reputation as they accumulate a critical mass of linkages, leading to them being targeted by 
most of the new entrants in the network, subsequently fortifying their centrality over time. 
Real life scale-free networks are typically found in industrial clusters, where a few large 
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vertically integrated firms surrounded by suppliers dominate and orchestrate the value chain. 
These networks are characterised by polarization of power and having an uneven and highly 
concentrated distribution of resources. These types of networks can also be characterized as 
being highly centralized, where the network is dominated by one or few central nodes. Such 
networks are particularly vulnerable for attack to these hubs, as their departure from the 
network can lead to the network being fragmented into unconnected subnetworks, which will 
obstruct the flow of information in the network (Giuliani & Pietrobelli, 2011). 
Propositions for the regional cluster networks’ structural characteristics 
Based on the above discussions, we showed how social network analysis can be a viable 
toolset which can be used to study the structural dynamics of regional clusters. In particular, 
we showed how SNA can be used to map structural features of a network such as density, 
average path length and clustering coefficient. Our theorizing also showed that the emergence 
and development of regional clusters often are politically motivated and involve initiatives 
such as institutional building and strengthening relations between actors. This might be 
distinctively different from situations where interfirm relationships emerge more organically 
between actors in a broad ecosystem through the everyday competition and cooperation 
between market actors such as providers, competitors, and customers. From this, it seems 
plausible that the underlying structural characteristics of the interfirm network between 
members of a regional cluster might differ from the network within a broader ecosystem that 
develops more organically. 
Our theorizing showed that regional clusters usually involve co-located companies, facilitating 
frequent interactions, trustful relations, and efficient flow of knowledge between the cluster 
members. Based on this, we can expect the members of NCE FI to be highly connected 
between each other, and that trustful relations are facilitated by firms clustering together in 
subgroups, which increases the efficiency- and reduces the distance information has to flow 
to reach any cluster member, compared to these members relations in the more organically 
developed network. Transferred to a network setting, this means that the network of NCE 
Finance Innovation should be well connected, and have a) higher density, b) higher global 
clustering, c) more cliques, and d) lower average path length than the organic network. This 
leads to our first proposition:   
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Proposition 1: The regional cluster network has a higher density, higher global clustering 
coefficient, more cliques, and a lower average path length, compared to the organic 
network. 
Furthermore, our presented theory proposes that repeated personal interaction which facilities 
trustful relations, can yield benefits such as reduced transaction costs, easier problem solving 
and increased learning capabilities for the actors embedded in a regional cluster. Therefore, 
we expect that the cluster members’ most important relations to a large extent are located 
within the regional cluster. This means that the relations between the cluster members should 
be highly visible in the more organically developed networks. 
From a network perspective this means that a) we expect to see the cluster members of NCE 
FI densely connected in the core of the organic network, and b) that the organic network does 
not deviate significantly from the maximum network, which consists of all the relations in 
both the organic and regional cluster network. This leads to our second proposition: 
Proposition 2: The regional cluster members are densely connected and at the core of 
both the organic network and the maximum network. 
Moreover, based on the literature describing common properties found in real networks, we 
expect that the regional cluster exhibits properties of a scale-free network where there are a 
few actors, or hubs, that are highly connected and facilitate much of the network’s information 
flow. This has been shown to characterize industrial clusters and could apply in a fintech 
context as well. The reason being that there are a few actors, such as the larger traditional 
banks and consultancies, which have significantly more resources than most of the actors in 
the regional cluster. We therefore assume that these firms might have a greater ability to create 
and maintain relations in the regional cluster, and therefore that they will be much more 
connected compared to most other firms. This leads to our third proposition: 
Proposition 3: The regional cluster network shows characteristics of a scale-free 
network. 
2.4.2 Implications of positioning in networks 
In addition to the proposed beneficial insights from studying the structure of the network, 
uncovering how the individual actors are positioned in a network can yield important insights 
both for the individual firms and the network as a whole. Because networks implicitly or 
explicitly represent a flow of resources such as information or influence, identifying the 
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specific actors that can potentially facilitate, obstruct, or otherwise broker this flow can give 
indications of vulnerabilities or “weak spots” in the overall structure of the network. 
Depending on the nature and characteristics of an actor’s connections, the position of an actor 
can thereby indicate the distribution of power, influence, and control of resources in a network 
(Giuliani & Pietrobelli, 2011). 
According to Lauman and Pappi (1976) and Freeman (1979), central actors are considered to 
be in advantageous positions relative to less central actors. With regards to communication 
and information access, this seems intuitive. The more central the firm, the higher the number 
of direct ties with other firms in the network, thus increasing the firm’s opportunities for 
learning and acquiring skills and experience. Firms with multiple information sources will 
additionally be less likely to miss vital information (Giuliani & Bell, 2005). An important 
insight is however, that too many connections can overload an actor in terms of redundant 
information, which can in itself be costly. The fact that building and maintaining relationships 
takes time and resources means that redundant connections will incur the opportunity cost of 
time invested in other value-creating activities (Giuliani & Pietrobelli, 2011). 
There are many ways to measure an actor’s connectedness and influence, and we will in the 
following first present four common and useful measures of centrality: degree centrality, out-
degree centrality, in-degree centrality, and betweenness centrality. Subsequently, we will 
discuss how it can be beneficial to identify actors that occupy structural holes by applying a 
measure called Burt’s constraint score.  
Degree Centrality 
The most basic and intuitive way to measure centrality is by counting the number of direct ties 
each node has, called the degree centrality. This measure can be used to find actors who are 
very connected and can quickly connect with the wider network. Actors with high degree 
centrality have easier access to information, knowledge, and resources in the network, than 
actors with low degree centrality (Giuliani & Pietrobelli, 2011). In directed networks, it can 
also be useful to know if the direct connections lead out of (out-degree) or into the node (in-
degree). This can provide more intricate information on the node’s importance given the nature 
and direction of its ties. For example, people with high out-degree centrality can be perceived 
sociable, while people with high in-degree centrality can be perceived as being popular. 
Degree centrality is given by the number of ties a node 𝑣 has to another actor in the network, 
denoted as 𝑑𝑒𝑔(𝑣):  
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(5)  𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 =  𝑑𝑒𝑔(𝑣) 
Out-degree and in-degree centrality can only be measured for directed networks. Out-degree 
centrality, denoted as 𝑑𝑒𝑔(𝑣), is the number of outgoing ties which originates from the node 
𝑣. In-degree, on the other hand measures the number of direct ties which leads into the node, 
denoted by 𝑑𝑒𝑔(𝑣) (Giuliani & Pietrobelli, 2011; Freeman, 1979). 
Betweenness centrality 
Betweenness centrality is the degree to which an actor can connect others that would otherwise 
be disconnected. It is measured by quantifying the number of times a node acts as a bridge 
along the shortest path between two other nodes. This type of centrality is synonymous with 
control over the flow of assets or resources between actors, meaning that they are actors “on 
whom others are locally dependent to get access to resources and assets are central in the 
network” (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Actors with a high degree of this type of centrality can 
often be viewed as having the role of gatekeepers having high influence and control of the 
flow of resources. When analysing a business network, identifying these actors is useful as 
their power is related to them being essential to the network as a whole. The reason being that 
their absence is likely to have disruptive effects, as it could split the network into unconnected 
subnetworks, thus hindering the flow of information or resources across the entire network. 
This implies that if there are only a few actors with high betweenness centrality, it may disrupt 
the network causing a vulnerability risk (Giuliani & Pietrobelli, 2011). The formula for 
betweenness centrality is the following:  





The total number of shortest paths between node 𝑠 to node 𝑡 is represented by 𝜎𝑠𝑡. The number 
of the shortest paths that goes through 𝑣 is 𝜎𝑠𝑡(𝑣).  
Structural holes 
Researchers have in some cases argued that creative ideas and radical innovation is better 
generated by informational diversity (Laursen & Salter, 2006). This diversity is achieved when 
an actor’s direct connections are themselves not densely connected to each other, implying 
that there is a “hole” in the network structure. The theory of Structural holes developed by 
Burt (1992) explains how an actor can benefit from being in a position where the actor’s 
neighbours are not, or poorly, connected to each other. The theory argues that opinions and 
behaviour are more homogeneous within, than between groups, so people located in the 
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intersection of multiple groups will be familiar with alternative ways of thinking and behaving, 
thus increasing their innovative capabilities (Burt, 2004). In addition, actors positioned on 
structural holes act as brokers between two disconnected actors and get strategic benefits such 
as control and access to new information. Actors that fill structural holes can therefore, due to 
their structural position, often be viewed as attractive relations by other actors. Identifying 
actors on structural holes yield insights for analysts of regional clusters as these actors have 
access to potentially unique and more diverse knowledge which can enhance the firm’s, and 
therefore indirectly the regional cluster’s exploitation of new ideas and the development of 
radical innovations (Ahuja, 2000; Rowley, Behrens, & Krackhardt, 2000; McEvily & Zaheer, 
1999; Zaheer & Bell, 2005). In addition, these actors are crucial for the flow of valuable 
information in a network, as they act as gatekeepers between groups of actors that would 
otherwise be disconnected.  
A commonly used measure of structural holes is Burt’s constraint (Burt, 2004), which 
measures how much the actor’s neighbours are also connected among themselves. This implies 
that the larger the constraint score, the less structural opportunities a node has for bridging 
structural holes. Subsequently, actors with lower scores are not as constrained by its 
connections, enabling the node to get access to new information outside a cohesive group. 
Burt’s constraint score (BCS) varies from 0 to 1 and the formula consists of two components 
which tells if node 𝑖’s time, resource and energy (weight) is spent directly (𝑝𝑖𝑗), and indirectly 
(∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑝𝑞𝑗)𝑞  on 𝑗 (Labun & Wittek, 2014). The direct component 𝑝𝑖𝑗 represent the proportion 
of tie weight from 𝑖 to 𝑗. The indirect component consists of an indirect path between node 𝑖, 
𝑗 and 𝑞, where the amount of indirect time, resource and energy is the product of the proportion 
of edge weights between 𝑖 to 𝑞, and 𝑞 to 𝑗.  The formula for Burt’s constraint is:  
(7)  𝐵𝑢𝑟𝑡′𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = (𝑝𝑖𝑗 + ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑞𝑝𝑞𝑗)
𝑞
2
, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑞 ≠ 𝑗 
Propositions for how the regional cluster members are positioned 
The theory presented above explains how different measures of centrality can provide insights 
into how the embedded actors’ positioning in a network can say something about their 
influence, access to information, and control of resource flow. We expect that in most real 
networks, the more mature and sizable firms in terms of for example number departments and 
employees, will have resources which can enable them to form and maintain more relations, 
than smaller, more nascent firms. As suggested in proposition three, we therefore expect that 
 28
traditional financial institutions occupy more influential positions in the regional cluster 
network, compared to other types of actors, and therefore that these actors a) will be highly 
central in the networks with regards to the presented centrality measures, and b) to a larger 
degree occupy structural holes by having on average a lower Burt’s constraint score. This leads 
to our fourth proposition: 
Proposition 4: Traditional financial institutions have on average the highest degree-, in-
degree- and out-degree centralities, and the lowest Burt’s constraint scores in the regional 
cluster network. 
Finally, we expect there to be a positive relation between how connected firms are in a regional 
cluster, and their perceived innovative ability from cluster membership. The reason being that 
the more central actors should, to a higher degree than less connected actors, be able to gain 
access to knowledge and valuable information in the regional cluster, which the presented 
theory suggests enhances their ability to innovate. Because of this, we expect that actors that 
perceive many cluster members as important relations is an indication that these firms have a 
greater ability to take advantage of external knowledge, and therefore find their membership 
to be important for their ability to innovate. In addition, we expect that actors that to a large 
degree act as bridges between otherwise disconnected actors, and therefore have high 
influence and control of resources in the network, should perceive membership in the cluster 
as more important for their ability to innovate, than other actors. Based on these expectations, 
we present our fifth proposition:  
Proposition 5: Regional cluster members with high out-degree centrality and betweenness 
centrality find their membership in the regional cluster to be more important for their 
ability to innovate within fintech than members who have a lower score on these measures.  
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3. Data collection and Methodology 
This section will first present this thesis’ research context, namely the Norwegian fintech 
ecosystem. Second, a thorough review of the assumptions and choices we made regarding how 
we collected our network data, based on fundamental methodological principles of data 
collection within network analysis will be accounted for. Third, a detailed description of the 
survey design- and distribution will be presented. Thereafter, we will discuss some ethical 
considerations regarding our data collection approach, and the validity of the collected data. 
Lastly, this section elaborates on the methods we have used to prepare and analyse our data. 
3.1 Research context: The Norwegian fintech ecosystem 
The financial industry has traditionally seen low levels of innovation and use of patent filing 
(Beck, Chen, Lin, & Song, 2016). In the age of the digital economy however, there are 
opportunities for nascent firms to innovate and challenge firmly established incumbents. This 
applies to a large extent to the financial industry, where fintech start-ups has increasingly 
gained a foothold with new user-friendly and innovative financial services (Arner, Barberis, 
& Buckley, 2016; Hornuf & Haddad, 2019). According to Knudsen and Bienz (2019) this 
recent disruptive development is closely linked to “changes in regulations, increased 
digitization, the emergence of alternative sources of financing, changing customer 
preferences, and so on”. As a result, the fintech sector, and fintech start-ups especially, have 
received significant investments globally in the last few years (Rubini, 2019).  
The term “fintech” represents the intersection between finance and technology in the bank- 
and finance industry and involves a transformation of the industry by cutting costs and 
improving quality of service delivery (Castro et al., 2020; Frame et al., 2018). Fintech holds 
many definitions, and Financial Stability Board’s (FSB) (2020) describes fintech as 
“technologically enabled innovation in financial services that could result in new business 
models, applications, processes or products with an associated material effect on financial 
markets and institutions and the provision of financial services.” (Financial Stability Board 
(FSB), 2020).  
Rubini (2019) argues that government support, a developed culture of innovation, proximity 
to customers, specialized talent, and flexible regulators are important factors that contribute to 
fintech growth. Taking these factors into account, regions like London, Singapore, Hong 
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Kong, New York, and Silicon Valley have over the years been traditionally well suited for 
fintech innovation, as these areas have long standing status as financial hubs and technological 
centres for development (Rubini, 2019). More recently, Norway has seen a surge in new start-
ups and investments within fintech, from around 30 fintech start-ups in 2016 to more than 130 
in 2019 (Bentsen & Bjørne, 2019). In addition, there has been a significant increase in public 
and private initiatives such as the development of government supported fintech clusters, 
specialized MBA-programs, incubators, and regulatory changes (Bentsen & Bjørne, 2019). 
Since the early 2000’s, Norway has supported the growth of regional clusters through national 
cluster programs (Innovation Norway). Norwegian Innovation Clusters are government 
supported programs that seek to trigger and enhance collaborative activities in the Norwegian 
industry. Among these programs are the Norwegian Centres of Expertise (NCE) which was 
initiated in 2006 and supported by Innovation Norway, the Research Council of Norway and 
SIVA. The programs aim to support growth in national and international markets through 
targeting, improving, and accelerating the clusters’ development-processes. 
In the wake of the recent development within fintech and cluster initiatives, the NCE Finance 
Innovation (NCE FI), which is now a part of the NCE program, was established by business 
leaders in banking, finance, insurance, and academia in 2017 on the Norwegian west coast. 
NCE FI is a formal institution aimed at supporting and facilitating interaction and cooperation 
between cluster participants. Its mission is to empower the Norwegian fintech community by 
facilitating technological innovation and collaboration in the intersection of finance and 
technology. Today, NCE FI has around 75 members, consisting of large incumbent banks, 
consulting firms, investors, academia and start-ups, among others (NCE Finance Innovation; 
Innovation Norway). 
We chose the Norwegian fintech context as the basis for this thesis’ analysis for several 
reasons. First, the growing interest in fintech in international and national policy making 
suggests that new insights into this field can be useful for policy makers. Second, the financial 
industry in Norway is changing rapidly, and new start-ups increasingly challenge the 
traditional, established financial firms. However, there seems to be growing recognition 
among the established actors that cooperation and strategic partnerships are efficient ways to 
face this challenge (Bentsen & Bjørne, 2019). Therefore, studying a nascent regional fintech 
cluster such as NCE FI through the lens of social network analysis can provide new insights 
into the relational characteristics of the Norwegian fintech ecosystem. This is especially 
interesting in the wake of the Revised Payment Services Directive (PSD2), an EU-directive 
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that was initiated in September 2019, aimed at improving security, and boosting competition, 
cooperation, and innovation by for example having traditional banks share customer 
information with third parties through API’s (Application Programming Interface)  (European 
Commision , 2020). 
Moreover, since NCE FI is by conventional standards a young cluster, it makes initial analysis 
of its network suitable for social network analysis. The reason is that the network might be 
less contaminated by sticky, potentially unproductive historic relations. Thus, it provides a 
better snapshot of more recent strategic relational choices made by the fintech actors. 
Moreover, as SNA can be used to analyse the development of networks by comparing them at 
different points in time, capturing the early version of the network enables more fundamental 
insights into how the regional cluster and the Norwegian fintech ecosystem are developing by 
studying the networks again later. This also enables facilitators to more efficiently apply 
incentives and policies to change the growth trajectory of the network structure towards 
favourable outcomes before the interfirm relations get too cemented.   
3.2 Methods for collecting network data 
When collecting network data, one must make decisions and assumptions as to what type of 
networks and relations to study. In addition, one must make decisions regarding which 
dimensions of a network that is relevant for the analysis. In the following we will present the 
assumptions behind our approach for collecting relational data between fintech actors inside 
and outside of NCE Finance Innovation.  
With regards to delimiting the network which will be analysed, Lauman et al (1983) proposes 
three main approaches to address network boundaries: position-based approach, relation-
based approach, and event-based approach. In a position-based approach, actors who are 
members of an organization or hold formally defined positions are included. A relation-based 
approach starts with a small set of nodes from the population of interest and expands to include 
other actors the first nodes share relations with. In an event-based approach, boundaries in a 
network are defined by looking at which actors have participated in key events for the 
populations (Marin & Wellman, 2010). 
We used the position-based approach to identify the population of interest for our analysis, 
which was fintech actors in Norway. We started by identifying the members of NCE Finance 
Innovation, which was our main population of interest. Thereafter, we targeted fintech actors 
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outside this regional cluster in order to generate a broader set of actors, that would be part of 
the organic networks. These actors were for example members of other Norwegian fintech 
clusters or were found in publicly available online databases. In total, we targeted a population 
of in total 103 actors, of which 74 were members of NCE Finance Innovation.  
Furthermore, we used the relation-based approach to identify the actors whom the targeted 
population had relations with. Through a survey, we asked respondents representing these 
actors of the targeted population to identify a limited number of organizations with whom their 
organization had relations with. We then compiled those lists and cross-connected them to 
create our dataset of relations. Before this step however, we needed to decide on which type 
of relations to analyse.   
According to Borgatti et al (2009), there are four broad categories of relations: similarities, 
social relations, interactions, and flows. Similarities between nodes occur when two or more 
nodes share the same kinds of attributes frequently (Marin & Wellman, 2010). Such attributes 
can be demographic characteristics, attitudes, locations, or group memberships. Nodes with 
social relations often have commonly defined roles such as friend or student. These relations 
are influential and typically based on often the node’s feeling for one another or cognitive 
awareness. Interactions are based on ties of behaviour between nodes like speaking with, 
helping, or inviting into one’s home. Lastly, flows describe relations based on exchanges or 
transfer between nodes, such as resources, information, or influence (Marin & Wellman, 
2010).  
The relational types we collected were the fintech actors’ innovation collaborators, providers, 
customers, competitors, and financing partners. We chose these relations as we argue that they 
are broad and together can encompass most of the possible relations occurring between 
organizations in a regional cluster. Based on the definitions above, these relations can be 
viewed as social relations as they have defined roles, such as “innovation collaborator of”- and 
“customer of” - the actor in question.  Importantly however, we argue that both interactions 
and flows between actors are important mechanisms of these social relations. In other words, 
we argue that these relations are not mutually exclusive, and we made broader assumptions as 
to what these relations contained, based on our chosen tie-measure which is described in the 
following.  
In order to measure the chosen relations, we asked the fintech actors to list and rank their 
maximum 10 most important providers, customers etc., where the relation the respondents 
ranked as number one was the most important, the actor listed as number two was the next 
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most important, and so on. This allowed us to study each individual actor’s opinion of how 
important another actor in the network was to that actor in terms of a specific relational type. 
This meant that the ties could be measured as directed and weighted, which gave us more 
detailed insights, rather than just recognizing the existence of the relations in terms of an 
undirected tie that states in binary terms if the relation exist or not.  
With regards to the weighting of ties, the scale we used in our survey reflects differences in 
degree of intensity, meaning that we can get insights into the strength of the relations between 
the actors. We assumed that the specific role, such as supplier, customer etc., indicates the 
social relation itself, and that the degree of  “importance” from the ranking of an actor gives 
an indication of the intensity of the relation, which says something about the degree of flows 
occurring in that relation.  
For the networks we created for our analysis, all the relational types were collapsed, such that 
the networks would consist of ties to innovation collaborators, suppliers, customers, 
competitors and financial partners. As such, a tie in one of our networks reflects many different 
types of relations. Even though there are important differences in the flow occurring between 
these relations, we argue that it is rational to assume that the more important any of these 
relations are to an actor, the more often these actors interact, and the more often they transfer 
knowledge and information between each other. We therefore assume that the weight of the 
ties between actors is a reasonable parameter for the degree of flows of information and 
knowledge between the actors, regardless of the specific type of relationship. This assumption 
allowed us to treat the strength of a tie similarly across all relational types, which made it 
possible to perform the network measures used to analyse our networks.  
3.3 Survey design  
Relational data can be collected through questionnaires or interviews, observations and/or 
texts. There was limited available data on observations or text that gave us information about 
the relations between our chosen population, and much less on the strength of the relations. In 
addition, considering that the population of fintech companies in Norway consists of at least 
130 actors (Bentsen & Bjørne, 2019), we evaluated that data collection of relations through 
interviews would be too time consuming. For our data collection, we therefore chose 
“Qualtrics”, a web-based survey tool which was used to distribute the survey through e-mail, 
something that allowed us to efficiently gather information about relations and their strength. 
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The assumptions and choices described in section 3.2 established the foundation for our survey 
design, which is explained in detail in the following. Appendix C shows the original questions 
from the distributed survey in Norwegian.   
The survey consisted of 23 questions in total, distributed into three parts. In part one, both 
members and non-members of NCE Finance Innovation were asked to list and rank their 
maximum 10 most important innovation collaboration partners, then their maximum 10 most 
important providers, competitors, customers, and finally financing partners. We provided 
definitions of all the relational types in the survey in order to minimize the risk of participants 
misinterpreting a relation, and therefore answer inaccurately. As an example, we defined the 
first relational type, innovation collaboration partners, as:  
“Private and public companies, educational institutions, or other types of organizations that 
your company collaborates with when it comes to innovation. This includes, for example, 
collaboration on the development of new products and services, improvement of existing 
products and services, and collaboration to solve relevant industry-specific issues” (translated 
from Norwegian, which was the language used for the survey). 
We collected the first set of relations in part one of the survey using a “free-recall” approach, 
which means that respondents could name any relation they considered important within the 
five relation types (customer, competitor etc.) (Giuliani & Pietrobelli, 2011). These relational 
data are the base for what we refer to as the “organic network”, where the respondents listed 
and ranked actors without a predetermined list to choose from. This means that the respondents 
in this part of the survey were not restricted to just listing other members of the regional cluster 
and could therefore include both members and non-members of NCE FI.  
After listing their relations with the free-recall method in part one, the respondents were asked 
if they were members of NCE FI or not. Non-members were directed to the end of the survey, 
while members of NCE FI were asked to list their most important relations once again in part 
two of the survey. In this part, the actors were given a complete dropdown list of the regional 
cluster members and could only choose their most important relations from this list. This 
approach, called “roster-recall” (Giuliani & Pietrobelli, 2011), generated a dataset of relations 
solely between the members of NCE FI, and the network based on these relations is referred 
to as the “regional cluster network”. The approach of collecting the fintech actors’ most 
important relations first through a free-recall approach, and thereafter through a roster-recall 
approach allowed us to investigate the differences between the bounded regional cluster 
network and the broader organic network the cluster members were embedded in. We 
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purposefully chose to initiate the survey with the free-recall approach, in order to minimize a 
potential bias of respondents listing more NCE FI-members if they had been presented with a 
list of these in advance.   
In part three, the respondents answering on behalf of the cluster member, were asked to answer 
some questions about the actor’s membership in the regional cluster. These answers helped us 
with identifying traits and the overall opinion of the benefits of being a cluster member.  
The first question was: “Is your company physically represented at the Fintech HUB at Media 
City, Bergen?”  
This information could potentially provide insights into how personal relations in the network 
were facilitated and could enable us to investigate if physical proximity was somehow related 
to the network’s structure. We chose however, due to limited time and resources not to 
prioritize this for our analysis (see “future research” in section 5)    
The second question was: “To what degree do you consider your organization’s membership 
in NCE Finance Innovation cluster to be important for your company’s ability to innovate 
within fintech?” 
This could give an indication of the degree to which the connectivity of an actor in the regional 
cluster network was important for the actors’ ability to innovate within fintech. By comparing 
the positioning and centralities of different actors to their answers to this question, we could 
investigate if there were any patterns in the network structure that could explain differences in 
the actors perceived innovation-benefit from participating in the regional cluster.  
The third question was: “In order to establish a collaborative partnership with another 
organization in the cluster, how often does your organization first go through NCE Finance 
Innovation cluster?” This could give an indication of the role of NCE FI in facilitating 
relations between the cluster members.  
3.4 Ethical considerations  
We identified two important ethical obstacles concerning our data collection: 1) collecting 
sensitive information about the actors, and 2) the risk of identifying the respondent answering 
on behalf of the fintech actor.  
As opposed to other methodological approaches, full anonymity at the stage of data collection 
for this thesis was not possible. The reason being that respondents had to report the 
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organizational names of fintech actors that they had relationships with. The ethical issue in 
this regard was that a respondent might report on relationships with actors that did not want to 
be named. This is especially the case with sensitive relational data. We considered our 
relational data as sensitive, as information on firms’ innovation collaborators, providers, 
customers, competitors, and financial partners in many cases are not publicly available 
information. Another problematic aspect with this is that actors may refuse to give information 
about its relations, and thus refuse to respond (Giuliani & Pietrobelli, 2011). This was one of 
the major challenges when collecting our data. In order to ensure responses, we had to 
thoroughly explain to the respondents how sensitive information would be anonymized and 
kept from the public eye. This meant for example that the relational data would not be shared 
with other respondents, and that the visualized network maps would not show the names of 
the actors. Even though the identity of the actors was treated as confidential, a risk is that it 
might still be possible to guess the names of the organizations by the virtue of their location 
in the networks. This meant that we had to ensure that the data would be handled in such a 
way that it would be nearly impossible to identify specific companies by reverse engineering 
information based on our presentation of findings. We therefore restrained from including 
characteristics such as number of employees and the age of the organizations in this thesis. 
Moreover, we ensured the respondents that we would only handle data through dedicated PC’s 
provided by our institution NHH. We anonymized all respondents and named organizations in 
the survey by giving them unique IDs. In order to keep track of our efforts to handle the data 
responsibly, we used a data management plan (“Datahåndteringsplan”) which we filled out 
according to NSD’s (Norwegian Centre for Research Data) guidelines.   
With regards to the risk of identifying persons, we enabled a function in Qualtrics which 
ensured that the survey did not identify, nor store personal data such as name or email 
addresses of the respondents. In surveys with open fields however, such as the open free-recall 
fields used in our survey, there is a possibility for respondents to write personal information. 
According to the EU-regulation for data privacy, GDPR, the respondents can enforce their 
rights for privacy, such as the right to know what kind of personal information we have stored 
and to withdraw their response. Because of these open fields, we obtained IP-addresses to be 
able to locate the respondent and fulfil the potential privacy rights. Nonetheless, in order to 
mitigate this risk, we informed the respondents on several platforms to avoid writing anything 
that could identify the respondent or other individuals. In order to fulfil privacy regulations, 
we applied for project approval for projects processing personal data through Norwegian 
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Centre for Research Data. Once this application was approved, we distributed the survey to 
the fintech actors.   
3.5 Data validity 
Our main concern regarding the data collection was the response rate of the survey. In order 
to generate accurate insights from how the relations were distributed in the regional fintech 
cluster and in the organic network, a relatively high response rate was required. Even though 
we sent out two reminders to the invited actors, the total response rate was 33% (see table 1), 
which we considered relatively low. This meant that our network would might not precisely 
represent the actual connections between the actors, as there were potentially many missing 
links. There are several potential reasons for a low response rate, whereas a probable reason 
was the length of the survey. The average time for participants to complete the 23 survey 
questions was 20 minutes, which was longer than we expected. The response rate may also 
have been affected by concerns regarding sensitive information and privacy concerns, as 
mentioned in section 3.4. Despite a response rate of just 33%, we were able to map a larger 
portion of both the regional cluster network and the organic network by combining both a 
position- and relation-based approach as explained in section 3.2, where the respondents 
named many organizations that were not initially targeted. Thus, out of the 34 responses, we 
were able to map in total 810 unique relations and 453 actors (see table 2), which illustrates a 
significant advantage with our chosen data- collection approach.  
 
(INSERT TABLE 1 HERE) 
 
During the data preparation, we found that a number of participants had not filled out any 
relations. In addition, we observed that a few participants in the first, free-recall part of the 
survey, chose to answer on a general basis. For instance, instead of listing a particular bank as 
an innovation collaborator, some answered “Banks”, which was a connection we had to 
remove. This indicates that the way our questions were formulated in this part of the survey 
might have been more precise. However, this applied to relatively few participants.  
From table 1 we observe that the response rate for the regional cluster members was higher 
than for actors outside the cluster, respectively 36% and 24%. A reason for the skewed 
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response rate between the two groups might be that we received direct contact information of 
all cluster members from the facilitator of NCE Finance Innovation, who also encouraged the 
members to participate in the survey. That allowed us to send the survey invitation directly to 
the organization’s contact person, whom we assumed either was able to answer on behalf of 
the fintech actor or knew a person in the organization more capable of answering. For the 
actors outside the regional cluster, we used the contact information from their home pages. 
Most of these email addresses were generic email addresses, which made it difficult to know 
who the survey was sent to in the organization, and if the email invitation became forwarded 
to the right person in the organization at all.  
Another challenge regarding our data collection was that we were not able to ensure that the 
person that responded on behalf of the organization had the right knowledge about the 
organization to provide the most accurate answers. In addition, one person’s opinion usually 
differs from another person’s opinion, meaning that two persons in the same organization 
might have answered and ranked the relations differently. This also implies for instance, that 
the answers about to what degree cluster membership was important for the actors’ ability to 
innovate were subject to individual opinions and not precise objective measures such as the 
rate of patent filings. This is considered when discussing our results in section 5.  
In addition, our approach of ranking actors based on the importance of relations, may not 
actually reflect equal differences in the strength of the relations (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). 
For example, the difference in importance between rank 1 and rank 2 may be larger than 
between rank 4 and rank 5. We therefore chose to regroup the rankings by assigning weight 
“5” to the top ranks 1 and 2, weight “4” for the ranks 3 and 4, and so on to weight “1” for rank 
9 and 10. If for example two actors would be of similar importance to the respondent, a 
grouping of ranks would at least to some degree mitigate this inaccuracy.  
Another challenge with our chosen approach for ranking and weighting the relations between 
the fintech actors, is that we did not obtain accurate information about the frequency of 
information flow between two actors. More accuracy could have been generated by for 
instance asking how often the respondent had collaborated on projects with another actor in 
the last year. We assumed however, that with our approach, the respondents would be able to 
cognitively retrieve and rank their relations without having to rely on external sources of 
information. By asking detailed questions about frequency and nature of flows between actors, 
we believed that the information would be either inaccurate or too time consuming, resulting 
in annoyance and fewer responses from the respondents.  
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Despite the considerations of data validity mentioned in this section, the data we collected 
enabled us to create, analyse and generate insightful findings from the resulting networks. We 
will further explain how we prepared our datasets from the data collection, before we present 
how we used it to analyse the data.  
3.6 Data preparation  
In the following, a description of how the collected data was prepared for analysis. We chose 
to create our networks by organizing our data in “edge lists” and “node lists” in excel. An edge 
list contains the actual links between the actors which is needed to create network objects, 
where the first column contains the “source ID’s” and the second column contain the 
corresponding “target ID’s”. The source ID represents the node that has a connection to the 
target ID. One such relation constitutes an edge, or link, which can be assigned a weight, 
representing the strength or magnitude of this relation.  A node list is a data frame which at its 
simplest contains a column with the ID’s of the entities. The advantage of creating a separate 
node list is that columns of nodes’ attributes can be included, such as names and categorical 
affiliations. The node list and edge list can then be combined through common ID’s in a 
software program which creates a network that can be visualized and analysed.  
We started assigning names and unique ID’s to all the actors that either participated in the 
survey, or that were listed by the survey participants. Actors that were listed with the free-
recall method, that for some reason were spelled differently, were given the same name 
manually. As an example, “NHH” and “Norwegain School of Economics” could be two 
different ways of spelling the institution name. Thereafter, we created five edge lists from the 
free-recall approach in part one of the survey, based on each of the five relational types 
(innovation collaborators, providers, customers, competitors, and financing partners). 
Subsequently, we created a second set of five edge lists based on each of the five relational 
types from the roster-recall approach in part two of the survey. The ties between the actors in 
the ten edge lists were assigned weights from 1-5 based on the actors’ perceived importance 
of another actor, as described in section 3.5.  
Thereafter, we made another edge list by collapsing the five edge lists based on the different 
relational types gathered from the free-recall approach in part one of the survey. This was the 
foundation for the organic network, consisting of 439 actors and 743 relations, whereas 666 
relations were unique (see table 2). The difference between the number of unique and total ties 
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means that 77 relations in this network were overlapping. The reason for overlapping ties in 
our networks is that an actor either listed another actor as more than one relation (e.g., 
financing partner and provider), and/ or that two actors listed each other as relations. 
Regarding the weighting of these overlapping ties, we assumed that if an actor had listed 
another actor in more than one of the five relations, or two actors had listed each other in one 
or several relations, it would be reasonable to add these weights indicating an even stronger 
importance of the relation between the two actors.  
As an example of how these weights were calculated, if actor A listed actor B in two relational 
types (e.g., customer and provider) with the corresponding weights x and y, the total weight of 
this tie would equal x + y. Moreover, if actor B also listed actor A as an important relation with 
the corresponding weight z, then the total weight of that tie would be x + y + z. This logic 
applies for all network measures and visualizations used in the analysis.   
In addition, we made another edge list by collapsing the five edge lists based on the different 
relational types gathered from the roster-recall approach in part two of the survey, where the 
respondents were limited to list and rank only members of NCE FI. This was the foundation 
for the regional cluster network, consisting of 59 actors and 299 relations, whereas 227 
relations were unique (see table 2).  
Furthermore, the two edge lists used for the organic network and the regional cluster network 
where collapsed onto one larger edge list consisting of all the relations from both part one and 
part two of the survey. This was the foundation for the maximum network, consisting of 453 
actors and 1042 relations in total, whereas 810 relations were unique (see table 2).  
 
 (INSERT TABLE 2 HERE) 
 
We made three corresponding node lists to the edge lists for the organic network, regional 
cluster network, and maximum network. The node lists for each network consisted of all 
actors’ unique IDs from the corresponding edge list, meaning both source ID’s and target ID’s 
of the actors. The actors in the node lists for the maximum- and organic network contained an 
attribute describing if these were members of NCE FI or not.  
The actors in the node list for the regional cluster network contained the attributes “fintech 
category” and “benefit”. Regarding fintech category, we categorized the actors in our data into 
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seven broad groups, based on elements of the fintech ecosystem presented in a paper by In 
Lee & Yong Jae Shin (2018) and somewhat adjusted to better suit the spectre of our responding 
actors. These categories are presented in table 3. The benefit column contained the actors’ 
responses regarding to what degree they considered their membership in the regional cluster 
as important for their innovative capabilities (see section 3.3). In this regard, the answers “To 
a very large degree” were represented by the number 5, “To a large degree” by 4, and so on to 
“To a very small degree” which was represented by 1. Answers from actors who answered 
“Not sure” were excluded in order to calculate averages among the different fintech categories 
for our analysis.  
 
(INSERT TABLE 3 HERE) 
 
Finally, the excel sheets for the edge and node lists for each of the three networks were 
connected in R through the actor’s common unique ID-numbers, which enabled us to analyse 
and visualize the networks.   
3.7 Analysing and visualizing network data  
This section describes the network measures we used, and how these were applied in order to 
investigate our five propositions. There are a number of applications designed for network 
analysis, and for our analysis we used the programming language “R” with the package 
“Igraph”. We mainly used Igraph to generate network measures from our dataset of relations. 
We chose to visualize our networks using “Gephi”, an open-source software package for 
visualization of networks. The reason was that, in our experience, Gephi generated clearer 
representations of our networks with higher resolutions compared to R, something that was 
important considering that some of our networks were relatively large and intricate.  
Proposition one 
In order to investigate our first proposition, we applied the following network measures to the 
organic- and the regional cluster network: density, average path length, and global clustering 
coefficient (see formula 1, 3, and 4 in the section 2.4.1, respectively). In addition, we counted 
the number of ties, nodes, and cliques for the networks through algorithms in R. 
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Most of the actors in the organic network were present because other actors had listed them, 
not because they had participated in the survey. As a result, many potential outgoing links 
from these actors were not present in our data. In order to cope with these missing outgoing 
ties, we applied the network measures on the two networks as undirected. This enabled a more 
logical comparison of the networks in proposition one.  
In order to investigate our second proposition, we visualized the maximum- and the organic 
network, both as undirected and weighted. As explained in section 3.6, the weight assigned to 
overlapping ties is the sum of all the weights of the relations between two corresponding 
actors. From these visualizations we could observe to what degree the regional cluster 
members were connected in the organic network, and how densely connected they were in the 
core of the organic network in comparison to the maximum network (which included the 
relations of both the organic- and the regional cluster network). In order to observe this, the 
nodes in both networks were given a colour based on their cluster-membership status. In 
addition, we calculated the percentage of regional cluster members that were listed and ranked 
by other members in the free-recall method in part one in the survey. This way we could attain 
more accurate insights into how important the cluster members considered other cluster 
members to be as relations. 
Proposition three 
To investigate proposition three, we visualized a generic version of the regional cluster 
network where the ties were both directed and weighted, as the proportion of missing outgoing 
links was much lower than in the organic network. This allowed us to visually inspect the 
structural characteristics of the network and compare these to the characteristics of network 
structures discussed in the literary review. In addition, we made a histogram of the distribution 
of the actor’s degree centrality scores which allowed us to investigate if the cluster had 
properties of a scale-free network.  
Proposition four 
To investigate proposition four, we applied the averages of the actors’ degree centrality 
(including in-degree and out-degree), betweenness centrality, and Burt’s constraint score 
across the seven fintech categories represented in the regional cluster (see formula 5, 6 and 7 
in section 2.4.2, respectively). These measures were presented in a table for our analysis. We 
included both the direction and weight of the ties when calculating these network measures 
and for illustrating three different versions of the regional cluster network, which are explained 
below. 
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In order to observe which actors had the highest degree centrality- and betweenness centrality 
measure, we first visualized two separate versions of the regional cluster network where the 
node size represented the actor’s degree- and betweenness centrality measure respectively. In 
order to observe what fintech category the different actors belonged to in these networks, the 
colour of the nodes represented the different fintech categories. To get deeper insights into 
how these centrality scores were distributed in the regional cluster, we made a histogram for 
the distribution of the actors’ betweenness centrality scores, in addition to the degree 
distribution histogram used to investigate proposition three.  
To observe structural holes in the network, we created a version of the regional cluster network 
that highlighted the actors with the lowest Burt’s constraint score. The nodes with a BCS of 
less than 0.15 were given a separate colour from the rest of the network’s nodes and included 
a label of these actors’ category affiliation.  
Proposition five 
To investigate proposition five, we first calculated the average scores for each fintech category 
based on what the actors answered regarding how important the cluster membership was to 
the actor’s ability to innovate within fintech (see section 3.3 and 3.6). We compared these 
scores with the categories’ average centrality measures, to see if there could be a potential 
pattern. We also visualized two additional regional cluster networks where the colours of the 
nodes reflected the degree to which the members answered that they find membership in the 
cluster important for their ability to innovate within fintech. The more intense (dark) the 
colour, the more important the actor considered its membership to be. The node sizes in these 
networks corresponded to the out-degree-, and betweenness centrality measures of each actor, 
respectively. This way we could see if there were any potential correlation between the size 
of the node and the degree to which membership was important for the actors’ ability to 
innovate within fintech.   
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4. Results 
This section presents the results of the analysis of our five propositions. Appendix A and B 
provides the results in tables and network-visualizations. First, we will present some general 
results from the cluster members answers in part three of the survey. 
4.1 General survey results  
Table 4 shows the distribution of the regional cluster member’ answers when asked how 
important membership in the regional cluster is for the actor’s ability to innovate within 
fintech. 43% of the respondents answered to some degree, which was the most common 
answer. 29% percent of the respondents answered that the cluster membership was important 
to a large degree (18%) or very large degree (11%) for their ability to innovate within fintech. 
18% considered their membership as important to a small degree (11%) or very small degree 
(7%). The remaining 10% were not sure.  
 
(INSERT TABLE 4 HERE) 
 
In table 5, the regional cluster members’ answers to how often the organization first goes 
through NCE Finance Innovation to establish a collaborative partnership with another 
organization in the cluster is shown. None of the cluster members who participated answered 
that they always go through the regional cluster. Half of the members answered that they 
sometimes do, while 14% and 25% answered that they usually and never go through the 
cluster, respectively. The remaining 11% were not sure. 
 
(INSERT TABLE 5 HERE) 
4.2 Proposition one  
Proposition one suggested that the regional cluster network had a higher density, lower 
average path length, higher global clustering coefficient and more cliques than the organic 
network. As seen in table 6, the regional cluster network has a significantly higher density 
(0.128) than the organic network (0.007). This indicates that the regional cluster has a higher 
degree of connectedness and potentially speed at which information diffuses among the 
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embedded actors, than the organic network. Furthermore, the average path length in the 
regional cluster network (2.439) is lower than in the organic network (3.715). This indicates 
that the distance information must flow to reach any actor in the regional cluster is significantly 
lower than in the organic network. The global clustering coefficient is more than five times 
higher in the cluster network (0.315) than in the organic network (0.059). This indicates a 
much higher tendency in the cluster for actors to form cohesive subgroups. As indicated by 
the higher global clustering coefficient, our findings also show that the number of cliques is 
significantly higher in the regional cluster network (470) than in the organic network (275). 
As expected in proposition one, the regional cluster network has a higher density, higher 
clustering coefficient, more cliques, and a lower average path length than the organic network.  
 
(INSERT TABLE 6 HERE) 
4.3 Proposition two 
In proposition two, the goal was to investigate to what extent the regional cluster members’ 
most important relations were in fact with other cluster members, mainly by visually studying 
how the cluster members were connected in the organic-and maximum network.  
In table 6, we observe that the regional cluster network has fewer unique ties and nodes, 227 
and 59 respectively, in comparison to the organic network which has 666 unique ties and 439 
nodes. First, this means that the participants in the first part of the survey listed a significant 
number of non-cluster members as their important relations within the five relational types 
(innovation collaborators, providers, and so on). In addition, as most of the respondents in the 
survey were cluster members (see table 1), it can indicate that many cluster members listed 
non-members as their important relations in part one of the survey. Supporting this, we found 
that just 20% of the relations listed by the cluster members in the first part of the survey were 
other cluster members. 
Figure 1 illustrates the maximum network, where the green nodes are cluster members of NCE 
FI, and the red nodes are external actors. Figure 2 illustrates the organic network, where the 
orange nodes are members of the cluster, while the purple nodes are non-members.  
 
(INSERT FIGURE 1 AND 2 HERE) 
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First, by visually inspecting the organic network we see that many cluster members are visibly 
connected in the core of the network, but that a significant number of the members are located 
more towards the periphery. In addition, we see that a large proportion of the cluster members 
are almost entirely connected with non-cluster members (purple nodes), also supported by the 
finding that just 20% of the cluster members most important relations are other cluster 
members.  
When visually comparing the organic- and the maximum network, we see that the members 
are somewhat more densely connected in the core of the maximum network than in the organic 
network, as indicated by the tighter clustering of the green nodes and greater thickness of the 
green ties in figure 1, compared to these characteristics in figure 2. This suggests that the 
cluster members listed fewer cluster members as their most important relations in the first part 
than in the second part of the survey. However, even though many of the regional cluster 
members are located more towards the periphery in both networks, nearly every member 
seems to be connected at least to one other cluster member. This means that the relations 
between most of the cluster members are at least present in the organically developed network. 
To sum up, proposition two is somewhat incorrect. First, by studying the number of unique 
ties and visually inspecting the organic network, we have found that a large portion of the 
regional cluster members important relations exist with external actors. In addition, the cluster 
members are less densely connected in the core of the organic network, compared to the 
maximum network, suggesting that many of the members’ relations within the regional cluster 
are not as strong as we expected. That is, the regional cluster is to a lesser degree than expected 
consisting of its members most important relations. 
4.4 Proposition three 
From proposition three, we suggested that the regional cluster network exhibited 
characteristics of a scale-free network. By observing figure 3, we can see that the regional 
cluster network’s core is densely connected and that a significant number of nodes are located 
towards the periphery. In addition, many of the peripheral actors are poorly connected to the 
core through mostly one or two relations, signalling a hierarchical network structure. The large 
share of outlying actors can to a large degree explain the low overall density of the network of 
12.8%. By first glance, this network exhibits the characteristics of a core-periphery network.  
 47 
 
(INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE) 
 
On the other hand, we observe from table 6 that this network has a relatively low average path 
length (2.439) and a somewhat high global clustering coefficient (0.315), which might suggest 
that it contains properties of a small-world network. This would indicate an efficient network, 
despite its low density of just 12.8%. However, compared to the theoretical description of a 
small-world network, there seems to be too many connections in the centre of the network, 
speaking against small-world and pointing towards a more hierarchical network. 
Figure 9 shows the histogram of the degree distribution for the actors in the regional cluster 
network.  By studying this histogram, we see that the distribution is right skewed with a heavy 
tail. This implies that a few actors have multiple times the connections than most of the actors 
in the network. While the network’s average degree centrality is 6.27 (see table 7), we see in 
the histogram that there are as many as 12 actors which have a degree centrality of 1. These 
actors are connected to only one other actor, meaning that they are the actors observed in the 
far periphery of the network shown in figure 3. On the other side of the spectrum there are 
three highly central actors, or hubs, with connections to 25, 29 and 33 other actors. This 
observation in combination with the observed hierarchical structure of the network can 
indicate that the regional cluster holds properties of a scale-free network, which is in line with 
proposition three.    
 
(INSERT FIGURE 9 AND TABLE 7 HERE) 
4.5 Proposition four 
In proposition four we expected traditional financial institutions in the regional cluster to have 
on average the highest degree centrality, in-degree and out-degree centralities, and the lowest 
Burt’s constraint score.  
In table 7 we observe that traditional financial institutions on average have 13.67 connections, 
while consultancies have 8.94 -, and technology developers have around 7.09 relations on 
average, supporting the fourth proposition. Fintech start-ups have in comparison on average 
4.72 connections in the network.  
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Figure 4 illustrating the regional cluster network shows how the degree centrality scores vary 
between the different fintech actors, where the node size represents the degree centrality score 
and node colour represents the actor’s fintech category. By observing this network, we see that 
many of the actors in the core of the network have significantly higher degree centralities than 
the more peripheral actors in the network. By identifying the largest nodes, we observe that 
the actors with the most direct relations, or alters, in the cluster mainly consist of traditional 
financial institutions (orange), consulting firms (green) and technology developers (blue). The 
fintech start-ups (purple) on the other hand are to a large extent located in the periphery of the 
network and are much less connected, as indicated by these firm’s low average degree 
centrality score in table 7. By comparing traditional financial institutions to the other fintech 
categories by looking at the average degree centrality from table 7 and figure 4, we see that 
traditional financial institutions have the highest average degree centrality which is in line with 
proposition four.   
 
(INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE) 
 
Furthermore, we observe from table 7 that consulting firms on average have the highest 
number of outgoing relations to other members, with an out-degree centrality score of 5.6. 
This implies that these firms on average consider the highest number of other actors in the 
cluster to be important relations, with traditional financial institutions (4.78) and technology 
developers (4.09) following behind. Fintech start-ups, on the other hand, consider on average 
just 1.83 members of the cluster as being important relations. Considering that consulting firms 
have a higher out-degree centrality than traditional financial institutions, this means that our 
expectation have not been met regarding this centrality measure.   
From table 7 we observe that traditional financial institutions by far have the highest average 
in-degree centrality score of 8.9 and are therefore considered to be important relations by the 
highest number of actors in the cluster. This is in line with our proposition that traditional 
financial institutions are highly central and influential in the regional cluster. In comparison, 
fintech start-ups are considered as important relations by on average 1.83 other members.  
In table 7 we see that traditional financial institutions have the highest average betweenness 
centrality score of 49.65, which again is line with our expectation. This means that a traditional 
financial institution on average acts as a bridge between two disconnected actors 
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approximately 50 times in the regional cluster network. Nonetheless, technology developers 
follow just behind with an average score of 43.14. In comparison, fintech actors act as bridges 
on average just 2.39 times in the network, while investment firms, academia and government 
never act as bridges in our directed network. Moreover, in the histogram of the actor’s 
betweenness centralities (figure 10) we identify two actors that lie on paths between other 
actors 320, and 240 times, thus significantly skewing the average scores. Figure 5 of the 
regional cluster network shows the distribution of betweenness centrality between the different 
fintech categories, where the node size represents the betweenness centrality score. We 
observe that the two largest nodes in the network with the highest betweenness centrality 
scores, are a traditional financial institution (orange) and a technology developer (blue).  
 
(INSERT FIGURE 5 AND 10 HERE) 
 
We observe in table 8 that 11.7% of the actors have a Burt’s constraint score (BCS) between 
0.00 and 0.15. These actors are the least constrained by their relations in the network. 
Nonetheless, 45.8% of the actors has a BCS between 0.15 and 0.35, indicating many actors in 
the network to a large degree occupy structural holes. In figure 6, the regional cluster is 
visualized and illustrate the seven (green) nodes with a BCS score under 0.15, including a 
label of their category-affiliation. The red nodes are the 52 nodes with a BCS score over 0.15. 
We observe the green nodes to be actors from two financial institutions, three consulting firms, 
one technology developer and one fintech start-up. Moreover, in table 7 we see that traditional 
financial institutions have the lowest average BCS of 0.26, only shared with academia. This 
also suggests that with regards to filling structural holes, financial institutions are some of the 
less constrained actors in the network, supporting proposition four that they occupy the more 
influential positions in the regional cluster.  
 
(INSERT TABLE 8 AND FIGURE 6 HERE) 
 
In sum our findings strongly support the fourth proposition that traditional financial 
institutions are the most central and influential actors in the regional cluster network. Despite 
having the second highest out-degree score behind consultancy firms, traditional financial 
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institutions have on average the highest degree centrality, in-degree centrality, betweenness 
centrality, and the lowest Burt’s constraint score in the regional cluster network.  
4.6 Proposition five 
In the fifth and last proposition we suggested that cluster members with high out-degree- and 
betweenness centrality scores should find their membership in NCE FI to be more important 
for their ability to innovate, compared to cluster members with lower scores on these measures.   
In figure 7 we observe the regional cluster network where the size of the node corresponds to 
the actor’s betweenness centrality score, and the intensity of the node colour (green) represents 
the degree to which the actor perceives cluster membership as important for its ability to 
innovate within fintech. By observing this network, we see that the larger nodes tend to be 
darker green than most of the smaller nodes. This indicates that there might be a correlation 
between an actor’s betweenness centrality and its perceived innovation benefit from being a 
cluster member, supporting proposition five.  
 
(INSERT FIGURE 7 HERE) 
 
In figure 8 we observe the regional cluster network where the node size corresponds to the 
actors’ out- degree centrality score, and the intensity of the node colour (red) represents the 
degree to which the actor considers their membership as important to their ability to innovate 
within fintech. Most of the largest nodes in the network are dark red, compared to most of the 
smaller nodes, suggesting that the actors with highest betweenness centrality scores considers 
membership as more beneficial for their ability to innovate within fintech, compared to actors 
with lower betweenness centrality scores. In sum, these findings support proposition five, 
which suggests that actors with high betweenness-and out-degree scores tend to consider their 
membership in the cluster to be more beneficial for their ability to innovate within fintech, 
than less central actors. 
 
(INSERT FIGURE 8 HERE) 
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Moreover, in table 7, we observe that consulting firms in the regional cluster on average 
perceive that they benefit the most with regards to their innovative capabilities from being a 
cluster member, with an average score of 3.83, followed by traditional financial institutions 
and technology developers with average scores of 3 and 3.2, respectively. From proposition 
four, we also found that these actors on average are the most central firms in the network. This 
supports proposition five, as it gives an indication that the most central firms perceive cluster 
membership as more important for their innovative capabilities than less central firms.  
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5. Discussion and conclusions 
The purpose of this thesis was to contribute to research on regional clusters, by studying the 
structural network characteristics of a regional cluster through the lenses of social network 
analysis (SNA). By mapping, analysing, and comparing the structural properties of the 
networks of members of the cluster NCE FI and the broader ecosystem-network which it is 
nested, we generated several interesting findings. In what follows, we will present four key 
insights based on these findings and discuss potential implications. Finally, we present 
recommendations for the facilitators of NCE FI, the validity of our results, and suggestions 
for future research.  
1st key insight: The regional cluster is highly connected to its external environment 
The first key insight is that the regional cluster to a lesser degree than expected contains its 
members most important relations. That is, the relations of most of the cluster’s members 
stretches beyond the boundary of the regional cluster.  
First, this finding can indicate that many of the cluster members’ important relations are not 
located on the Norwegian west coast where NCE FI is headquartered, but in other parts of, or 
outside Norway. This might imply that geographical proximity is less important to the 
embedded firm’s ability to innovate than traditional literature on clusters indicates. As 
digitalization minimizes geographic distance and enables alternative forms of collaboration, 
this might be reasonable to assume (Autio, 2017). Because most business models within 
fintech are based on digital technology such as cloud computing, AI, cryptocurrency, software-
as-a-service, digital banking and so on, it might be the case that geographical proximity to for 
example customers, providers, or funding partners, is a non-essential factor for well-
functioning business relations and joint innovation activities. Boschma (2005) for example 
suggests that other dimensions of proximity, namely cognitive, social, organizational and 
institutional to a large degree can explain the likelihood that firms create interfirm linkages.  
The fact that the members to a large extent consider external actors to be important relations 
might suggest that there are less potential beneficial relations in the regional cluster network, 
or that the relations that do exist are weaker than what was anticipated based on theory. One 
interpretation from this is that the overall degree of trustful relations, which has been found to 
facilitate a cooperative, knowledge sharing environment, may be lower than expected, 
therefore possibly limiting the regional cluster’s potential for stimulating innovation. As noted 
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by Porter (2000), the mere presence of a regional cluster does not guarantee functioning cluster 
linkages. In addition, there might be instances of cluster memberships which are of merely 
symbolic character, something Inkpen (1996) suggests are the case within many regional 
clusters. Because building and maintaining relations are costly, the total cost of membership 
(including the membership fee) would in this case be higher, as maintaining potentially less 
beneficial relationships incur the opportunity cost of time invested in other value creating 
activities. 
 
From proposition one on the other hand, we found that the cluster-relations that the members 
of NCE FI listed in part two of the survey, makes up a network that has a lower average path 
length and a higher density than the organic network. This may imply that the speed at which 
information potentially diffuses in the regional cluster is higher than in the organic network, 
thereby enabling more efficient flow of knowledge between the embedded actors. In addition, 
as the regional cluster network has a higher degree of local connectivity than the organic 
network, there could be potential for trustful relations and reciprocity norms, something that 
can lead to increased flow of tacit, quality knowledge, effective joint problem solving and 
reduced transaction costs. 
 
Moreover, our findings may imply that the regional cluster is attracting a somewhat narrow 
set of actors, and that many of the actors’ important relations are in the periphery of fintech 
and are therefore not considered candidates for cluster membership. This also suggests that 
the strategic relations in the Norwegian fintech ecosystem consists of a larger, possibly more 
diversified group of actors than one might expect. It might be the case that many important 
relations exist outside a traditionally defined fintech-sphere, indicating that the term “fintech” 
is indeed broad, and that it is in the intersection of many overlapping industries, also in 
Norway. One explanation for this might be that actors outside the financial industry are 
increasingly making entry and blurring the boundary of what is considered fintech (see for 
example Schwienbacher & Larralde, 2012; Zachariadis & Ozcan, 2016; Knudsen & Bienz, 
2019).  
 
Following that fintech is a broad term, the high number of external relations might also be 
explained by the composition of firms in the regional cluster. To many of the larger, mature 
firms in the cluster such as incumbent banks and consultancies, fintech might be just a small 
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part of their business operations, meaning that their most important relations take place with 
other firms in different industries. In addition, fintech start-ups, which is the largest category 
of the cluster members in NCE FI, are possibly considered as less important relations by other 
members, because most start-ups are not yet fully operating and lack resources to create and 
maintain reciprocally beneficial relations. This seems plausible when considering the fintech 
start-ups’ low average in-degree score of 1.83, compared to traditional financial institutions 
with about 8.89 actors on average considering these firms as important relations (see table 7).  
 
However, because the regional cluster is young, one could expect that many of the strategic 
relations are still in their infancy, meaning that they are currently less relevant to the members 
than older relations existing in the organic network. Moreover, due to the cluster’s young age, 
there might not have been established that many strategic relations yet, as trustful relations 
take time and resources to develop. 
 
Nonetheless, research indicates that linkages stretching outside a regional cluster can be 
important, if not essential for a cluster’s overall ability to innovate. According to Wolfe and 
Gertler (2004), regional clusters are not self-sufficient when it comes to the knowledge 
capabilities they draw upon. Linkages to outside actors can bring in new knowledge that can 
facilitate local innovation in the cluster. Many successful regional clusters for example 
deliberately establish international linkages in order to gain access to otherwise locally 
unavailable knowledge and resources and to avoid technological lock-in (Turkina & Van 
Assche, 2018). Granovetter’s (1973) research suggested that in order to obtain non-redundant 
information, one should seek information beyond one’s closest connections. That is, weak ties 
are useful, in that they facilitate access to novel information. Friedkin (1982) found that 
organizations having many weak ties created diversity in the information flow, while strong 
ties lead to more effective distribution of this information. The fact that the cluster members 
of NCE Finance Innovation have many external relations might therefore indicate that the 
regional cluster is positioned in the larger ecosystem-network in a way that enables external, 
otherwise locally unavailable knowledge to flow into the regional cluster, but that the 
distribution of this knowledge locally might be better facilitated by strengthening the cluster’s 
internal relations.  
 
Another possible implication from the regional cluster having many ties to the external 
environment, might be that the regional cluster is positioned to generate radical innovations. 
 55 
Atuahene-Gima (2005) found that exploration is positively related to radical innovation, while 
exploitation is positively related to incremental innovation. According to March (1991) the 
concept of exploration can be linked to activities such as searching, variation-seeking, 
discovering and experimenting, while exploitation involves activities such as refinement, 
efficiency-seeking and implementation. Furthermore, regional clusters in more traditional 
industries are often associated with incremental innovation (Asheim & Coenen, 2005), while 
complex and disruptive technologies tend to be based in more open systems, utilizing the 
regional clusters’ external networks (Albors-Garrigos & Hervás-Oliver, 2012). This might 
indicate that a regional cluster such as NCE FI, with seemingly porous boundaries and many 
connections to the external environment, is well positioned for explorative activities, 
increasing opportunities for technological breakthroughs. Moreover, as one interpretation of 
our findings are that the members are somewhat weakly connected internally, the regional 
clusters ability to facilitate process-innovation might be lower, as this is highly dependent on 
the sharing of abstract, tacit knowledge facilitated by trustful relations (Newell et. al, 2002).  
 
In sum, despite many possible interpretations from our findings, our data does not enable us 
to say anything definitive about how the degree of external relations, or the strength of internal 
relations affect the regional cluster’s ability to stimulate innovation among its members. 
Nonetheless, this discussion suggests that clusters should not be viewed as isolated entities 
disconnected from the outside world, and that boundary spanning linkages could be an 
important indicator for the regional cluster’s ability to tap into diverse, locally unavailable 
knowledge, which can facilitate local innovation. Our findings do, however, suggest that the 
relations existing within the regional cluster might be weaker than what was expected, which 
can limit the degree of trustful relations and therefore the cluster’s ability to take advantage of 
this external knowledge. Taking this into consideration, our findings can suggest that striking 
a balance between facilitating strong relations within a cluster, and at the same time ensuring 
weaker ties that connects the cluster to its larger ecosystem might be beneficial for the regional 
cluster’s ability to obtain innovation generating knowledge, while at the same time being able 




2nd key insight: The regional cluster network exhibits hierarchical properties  
Our second key insight is that the network of NCE Finance Innovation exhibits characteristics 
of a hierarchical network. This might indicate that the members in the core constitute an “elite” 
and that they hold advantages that the peripheral members might lack. Theory suggests that 
the central firms in these networks have fast access to reliable information and quality 
knowledge, increasing these firm’s learning capabilities, while the outlying actors are just 
marginally included in these knowledge-generating networks, thus hampering these actors’ 
innovative capabilities (Giuliani & Bell, 2005). However, as discussed in the first key insight, 
one could also argue that peripheral actors that connect the regional cluster to its external 
environment might be essential for the core actors’ access to novel ideas stemming from the 
larger ecosystem.  
 
Another interesting finding, signalling its hierarchical properties, is that the regional cluster 
network inhibits properties of a scale-free network, which is found in many real-world 
networks. The plausible mechanism for explaining this characteristic is that as the regional 
cluster grows, new actors are more likely to form relations with the actors that are already 
well-connected, known as preferential attachment. One plausible reason for this characteristic 
in our context is that for new actors joining the regional cluster, there could be a lack of 
information about which actors to connect with. As proposed by Gould (2002), new entrants 
can find it costly to perform quality judgements and will therefore tend to connect to the highly 
reputable actors. These actors’ favourable reputations and status are thereby increased by 
accumulating a critical mass of linkages, drawing even more connections by new entrants, 
thus cementing their high centrality and influence. This seems plausible in our context as well. 
Our findings indicate that a significant proportion of the respondents did not use NCE FI to 
acquire information on which actors who might be beneficial to establish new relations with 
(see table 5). Therefore, they might mitigate costly quality judgements by forming relations 
with the more reputable actors. Theory suggest that these few central firms, often referred to 
as hubs, accumulate influence and power when the clusters grow, and therefore increasingly 
gain control of much of the network’s resources, such as knowledge and innovations.  
 
In addition to the consequences from possessing characteristics of a hierarchical core-
periphery network, the low number of highly central actors in the network makes it vulnerable 
to attack towards these actors. The reason is that the presence of hubs decreases the average 
path length as they lower the distance between small degree nodes with fewer connections. If 
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these actors leave the network it could be fragmented into disconnected subnetworks, which 
obstructs the flow of knowledge and other assets between the cluster members. Nevertheless, 
the presence of a few highly influential hubs indicate that this network is less vulnerable to 
random failure, as the chance of a random failure affecting the hubs is relatively small. 
Moreover, if the less connected actors leave the network, it might not have a large effect on 
the networks ability to diffuse information internally, as the hubs to a large extent would hold 
the network together and facilitate efficient flow of information across the network. In 
addition, an advantage with a centralized structure could be that it may facilitate easier 
coordination across the network. This can be advantageous for initiating joint problem-solving 
activities requiring efficient coordination between the members, such as lobbying. 
 
In sum, our discussion suggests that the regional cluster’s hierarchical properties may create a 
divide in terms of which actors are positioned to access to the cluster’s knowledge base. In 
addition, preferential attachment may cause some firms to increase their already substantial 
influence and power as new members join, which signals that it might be costly for new 
members to obtain information about other actors in the regional cluster. Furthermore, this 
mechanism can increase the regional cluster’s vulnerability as these highly connected actors 
are responsible for much of the network’s internal diffusion of knowledge. Nonetheless, our 
findings can suggest that the regional cluster could enhance the overall innovation capabilities 
in the network by increasingly incorporating the peripheral actors into the knowledge 
generating core of the network, while at the same time encouraging ties to the external 
environment.  
 
3rd key insight: The regional cluster network’s distribution of influence is skewed 
Our third key insight is that there are large differences in terms of which types of actors obtain 
the most potentially influential positions in the regional cluster network. The actors with the 
most connections in the network of NCE FI consist of mainly traditional financial institutions 
and consulting firms. These actors are expected to have easy access to information, knowledge 
and resources compared to less central actors. Furthermore, traditional financial institutions 
are on average considered as important relations by the highest number of actors in the cluster. 
This can imply that most of the information and knowledge from other actors is first 
transferred directly to these firms, something that may be advantageous as it enables these 
actors access to potential novel information from several direct sources which also increases 
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their ability to interpret this information and generate quality knowledge. On the other hand, 
these firms might be at higher risk of relational inertia if their cluster-relations get to cemented, 
causing shared information to become homogenous and redundant.  
Furthermore, consultancies consider the highest number of actors in the cluster to be important 
relations on average. This can imply that much of the regional cluster network’s information 
and knowledge is first passed on from consultancies as they can directly spread information 
to the most other cluster members. This puts consultancies in potentially advantageous, 
influential positions in the network. The reason being that they to an extent might steer the 
direction of cluster-initiatives by generating support from their direct relations, and thereby 
control much of the cluster’s knowledge generating activities.  
Our findings regarding the distribution of betweenness centrality-scores indicate that a 
significant number of actors in the regional cluster depend on mainly two actors, a traditional 
financial institution and a technology developer, to make connections with other actors in the 
network. These firms are possibly influential and powerful, as they control much of the 
information passing between other actors in the network. Many members in the regional 
cluster network might therefore be dependent on these highly central actors to access 
resources, knowledge, and information from otherwise more distant or disconnected actors 
inside the cluster. The central cluster members can therefore be said to have the role of 
gatekeepers or mediators and as such might be essential to the diffusion of resources in the 
regional cluster.  
Moreover, traditional financial institutions and consultancies are some of the actors that are 
least constrained by their connections being tightly connected to each other. These actors 
occupy structural holes in the network and have the advantage of accessing potentially unique 
and diverse knowledge from several sources which can enhance these actor’s exploitation of 
creative new ideas and therefore radical innovations. In addition, these actors get control- 
benefits from brokering information between disconnected actors. As such, these actors are 
crucial for the flow of valuable information in the network and might be considered attractive 
relations by other actors, as it enables them to access novel information from more distant 
actors. The network is likely vulnerable to targeted attacks toward these actors, as their 
absence could either split the network into unconnected subnetworks, and thereby either 
completely break off the information flow between groups, or at least disrupt communication 
between other actors. Their absence could slow the diffusion of information and knowledge 
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and increase the risk of information-distortion. The fact that there are just a few actors 
controlling most of the information flow between other actors in the network might therefore 
constitute a potential vulnerability in the regional cluster network.  
The fintech start-ups on the other hand are to a large extent located in the periphery of the 
network and are much less connected, indicating both less and slower access to the network’s 
resources. Fintech start-ups might be at a disadvantage in the network as they obtain much less 
influential positions and are therefore reliant on the more central firms to obtain information 
from otherwise relatively distant actors within the regional cluster. This finding is 
somewhat logical, as one would expect traditional financial institutions and consultancies to 
have enough resources, such as employees and financial capital, to establish and maintain 
strategic relationships, as opposed to fintech start-ups often lacking these resources. Besides, 
our findings imply that larger traditional banks and consultancies have on average a higher 
number of innovation collaborators, providers, customers, competitors, and financial partners 
in the regional cluster than fintech start-ups. One plausible reason in the case of customers is 
that many start-ups in their early phase have not yet established customer-relations with other 
businesses. Moreover, many fintech start-ups specialize in crowdfunding, money transfer, 
personal finance, consumer banking etc., in which the customers are often individuals (B2C). 
In other words, many of their potential customers are not present in the regional cluster as 
opposed to for example consultancies and technology developers which are more reliant on 
other businesses as their customers (B2B). Despite having potentially less and slower access 
to the regional cluster’s internal knowledge, fintech start-ups in the periphery of the network 
with many weak ties to external actors may nonetheless be highly important to the network’s 
innovation capabilities as they can enable influx of non-redundant information from the larger 
ecosystem.     
In sum, our discussion suggests that there are large differences in terms of connectedness and 
influential positions in the network. The more influential positions are seemingly to a large 
degree dominated by traditional financial institutions and consulting firms, who theory suggest 
have faster access to the network’s knowledge pool and might be important for the networks 
ability to diffuse information. In addition, these findings can suggest that the degree of 
connectedness is not incidental, but that the properties held by the cluster members to a degree 
determines their positioning and influence in the regional cluster.  
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4th key insight: Connectedness might matter for perceived innovation benefits 
An interesting finding is that having an influential position in the regional cluster, in our case 
indicated by high betweenness centrality and out-degree, at least to some extent seems to 
correlate with the degree to which members find cluster-membership important for their ability 
to innovate. We find that the most central actors in our network, which are consultancies, 
traditional financial institutions and technology developers, on average stated that they got 
more benefits from their cluster membership than less central actors. This seems intuitive, as 
actors with high betweenness centrality possibly have more influence and control of resources 
in a network and should therefore be able to reap more benefits from being embedded in the 
regional cluster. In addition, one would expect actors who consider many of the cluster 
members as important relations to find it more beneficial to be a part of the regional cluster. 
As research proposes a correlation between trustful, reciprocal relations and the degree to 
which firms can take advantage of external knowledge, one could expect that actors with 
stronger relations have a greater ability to innovate. This suggests that, with regards to 
innovative capabilities, larger, more central firms such as banks and consultancies might be 
more capable of utilizing external sources of knowledge from cluster membership. On the 
other hand, one could also have assumed that smaller, possibly less connected firms, such as 
many fintech start-ups in our network, would be even more dependent on their existent 
relations in the cluster, and therefore find membership more beneficial than what our results 
indicate. The reason being that these actors should be more reliant on establishing relations 
with for example financial partners in order to raise capital and enabling them to “get to 
market”.  
In sum, our findings indicate that there could be a correlation between the individual 
members’ connectedness and influence in the regional cluster, and the degree to which 
membership is important for the actors’ ability to innovate. This can suggest that relations 
matter in terms of outcomes for the individual actor, which is a fundamental assumption of 
research on social networks (Kilduff & Brass, 2010). This might imply that the resources held 
inside a firm could be important for explaining or predicting the firm’s level of connectedness, 
and thus for explaining its predicted benefits from regional cluster membership. This is an 
important insight for cluster facilitators and researchers, as it suggests that start-ups with less 
resources might find it difficult or costly to establish strategic relations, which can negatively 
affect their benefit from membership. However, as these interpretations are based on the 
member’s subjective perception of innovation capability, this finding might not reflect actual 
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benefits to innovation performance. In addition, the fact that no actors in the categories funding 
partners, academia or governments responded to this question, might bias our interpreted 
results.  
Recommendations 
We suggest that the regional cluster facilitator investigates possible mechanisms that could 
both strengthen the existing- and create new relations between the regional cluster members. 
As suggested by Porter (2000), facilitators should ensure efficient and regular communication 
in order to increase open communication and build trust. In addition, if there are in fact many 
potential beneficial relations in the cluster, but the members themselves lack the resources to 
locate these, the cluster facilitator could implement mechanisms to increase the visibility of 
other actors in the cluster, which could make potential synergies more apparent. Another 
possible course of action could be to broaden the regional cluster focus to encompass a more 
diverse set of actors, and thereby include more potentially beneficial partners. NCE FI recently 
announced that they would increase their scope and become a nation-wide cluster, thereby 
including many new actors in the cluster going forward (Skjelsbæk, 2020). This can imply that 
the regional (in this case national) cluster, will be even more connected to the larger fintech-
ecosystem which can boost the number of weak ties and facilitate easier access to novel 
knowledge and ideas. However, as research suggests that trustful relations are facilitated by 
frequent personal interaction, facilitators should be aware that it might be more difficult to 
strengthen interfirm relations and facilitate coordination in a larger, more geographically 
dispersed network. This might hamper the cluster’s overall innovative capabilities stemming 
from types of innovations that require efficient exchange of tacit, context dependent 
knowledge. 
With regards to the structural characteristics of the network, the hierarchical structure might 
be altered by implementing strategies to establish new relations between the peripheral actors 
themselves, such as fintech start-ups, and between the peripheral and more central actors. This 
can enable the least central companies’ greater access to the regional cluster’s knowledge 
creation and increase the overall density of the network. In addition, due to the preferential 
attachment mechanism causing new members to mainly seek relations with highly central, 
reputable hubs, facilitators could seek to make information about other actors more available, 
for example by facilitating increased personal interactions between the different members. In 
the longer run, this could potentially reduce the regional cluster’s dependence on these hubs 
 62
and thereby decrease the associated risk of these leaving the network. In the short run however, 
these hubs are possibly vital for the diffusion of information in the network and ensuring their 
continued membership in the cluster could be necessary. In order to increase the regional 
cluster’s local innovation processes, facilitators could aim at promoting the already somewhat 
local cliquishness in the network structure, as it facilitates the sharing of high-quality 
knowledge. Moreover, as connections with distant actors could be desirable as it enables 
greater access to novel information, the cluster facilitator could promote structural holes and 
brokerage positions aimed at connecting the regional cluster to other national- and 
international knowledge networks (Giuliani & Pietrobelli, 2011). 
Despite the potential advantages of forming new ties, policy makers and regional cluster 
facilitators should be aware that redundant connections could be costly to maintain for the 
members and might reduce the overall level of innovation as too many ties might overwhelm 
the most central actors with information. Facilitators might therefore consider limiting the 
encouragement of connections to encompass actors that show potential for synergies.  
Lyon & Atherton (2000) argues that the nature of interfirm relations in regional clusters is 
highly dynamic and constantly evolving, therefore suggesting that attempts to understand 
clusters through a snapshot and to fix boundaries are not realistic. Considering this, regional 
cluster facilitators, policy makers and researchers can use SNA to investigate how a policy or 
initiative has changed a regional cluster network over time. By mapping the network’s 
relations before and after a policy treatment, the changes in actors positioning and the 
structural characteristics of the network can yield important insights into the impacts of the 
particular initiative. For example, analysts might investigate how centrality-measures develop 
over time, to generate insights into how some actors (or groups of actors) have become more 
influential or not. By studying the changes in the structural characteristics of the regional 
cluster, one can know whether the cluster has become more or less egalitarian, efficient, 
fragmented and so on (Giuliani & Pietrobelli, 2011). 
Facilitators and policy makers should, however, be aware that network structures should not 
be imposed on the regional cluster’s members. Research suggests that self-organizing systems 
might be more advantageous for innovation than externally designed networks (Checkland, 
1999; Gausdal, 2008). Whether it is even possible to externally steer the development of 
regional clusters is a debated topic (Gausdal, 2008). However, research suggests that it is 
possible to initiate mechanisms that support and stimulate development (Human & Provan, 
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2000; Wenger, Mcdermott, & Snyder, 2002). Nevertheless, this should be done on the 
members’ terms, and the development of a regional cluster should therefore be based on the 
members’ own knowledge and interests. Gausdal (2008) for example proposes that this can be 
achieved by facilitating collective reflection processes. 
Weaknesses and validity of results 
As discussed in the methodology section, the relatively low response rate affects our results. 
One problem with network-data in particular is that non-respondents may significantly distort 
results. For example, if one highly connected actor is not present in our data, this can lead the 
mapping of the full network to be misleading (Borgatti & Molina, 2003). However, we expect 
that the response rate was high enough so that the most central actors were mentioned, and 
therefore included in the networks.  
Due to a relatively low response rate, measurements such as the network density and the 
distributions of centralities could be biased. Most of the actors in our networks did not 
participate in the survey and are therefore present only because they were mentioned by 
survey-participants. Therefore, many of their potential outgoing links are not present in our 
data, suggesting that the density measures for both the regional cluster network and organic 
network might be higher. In the case of the regional cluster network, many of the peripheral 
actors might, due to missing outgoing links, have higher centrality measures than our data 
dictates, indicating that the distribution of degree centrality might be less skewed than what 
our results show. This could again indicate a less hierarchical, and more decentralized network 
than what is argued in this thesis. We believe, however, that the low response rate does not 
significantly affect our conclusions. We believe the response was high enough to provide 
enough indications toward the networks’ actual properties and distribution of centralities. 
Another challenge regarding the response rate, was that very few or none of the participants 
in the survey represented organizations within investment firms, government, academia, or 
funding partners. As a result, these fintech actors are at most visible in our networks to a small 
degree. Thus, we are not able to indicate too much about their positions and potential influence 
in the regional cluster.  
Furthermore, this thesis’ aim was mainly to investigate networks in a descriptive manner. One 
caveat of SNA that network visualisations often can provide vague and imprecise answers. 
Interpretations can often rely on one’s subjective opinion, especially when there is high 
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ambiguity. More precise answers could have been attained by applying econometric 
techniques such as linear or multiple regression to study effects. This could have been applied 
to study for example the correlation between different centralities (independent variable) and 
the innovation-benefits gained from being a regional cluster member (dependent variable). 
However, we considered the number of responses to be somewhat too low to generate accurate 
and insightful results from performing regression. In addition, to say something about causal 
relationships would require a discussion around issues such as random sampling, omitted 
variable bias, simultaneity, and so on. Therefore, due to the time and resources available, it 
did not seem achievable to perform a detailed econometric discussion around this in the master 
thesis. In addition, more accurate insights could have been made possible by having an 
unbiased, objective performance measure for innovation, such as the number of realized 
innovation projects, in contrast to our chosen subjective indication of innovation performance.  
Lastly, there are multiple aspects to analyse in our data which were not prioritized. We could 
for example have investigated the different subnetworks (e.g. provider, customer, competitor 
etc.) in more detail, which could provide deeper insights into how the relations and influence 
were distributed in the regional cluster. The network measures on the subnetworks from each 
of the five relational types we collected in the survey, are presented in table 9 and 10 in  
appendix A for the organic and the regional cluster network, respectively.  
Future research 
By comparing the structural characteristics of two or more regional cluster networks, and 
applying accurate performance indicators of innovation, such as the rate of patenting filing, 
research could gain deeper insights into which structural characteristics might be best suited 
for innovation. On the actor level, researchers could use multiple regression techniques to 
explore correlations more reliably between the attributes of actors and their centrality 
measures in the network. Such techniques could also be used to attain accurate insights into 
how centralities might affect individual firm performances. 
Future research could also investigate how to more efficiently facilitate advantageous 
alterations to the structure of the network, for instance by establishing or strengthening 
relations through financial incentives, collective reflection processes, networking activities 
and so on. In addition, by studying the different subnetworks of a regional cluster’s 
competitors, customers, providers etc. separately, research could gain deeper insights into the 
relational characteristics of a regional cluster, such as which subnetworks might facilitate or 
 65 
impede innovation (see table 9 and 10 in appendix A). Moreover, this could yield insights into 
the relational aspects of a regional cluster’s competition and coopetition-dynamics, investment 
behaviour etc., which could provide new insights into ecosystems and regional clusters. In a 
fintech-context, this might be especially interesting in the wake of PSD2, which is expected 
to dramatically change the relational dynamics of the financial industry and therefore the 
fintech ecosystem in the years to come. 
Lastly, as digitalization minimizes geographic distance and enables alternative forms of 
collaboration, geographical proximity might not be as important as traditional research on 
regional clusters has indicated. Future research could use SNA to investigate the importance 
of geographical proximity for the formation of trustful relations, by mapping and analysing 
relations in clusters where the members’ business models are mostly digitally driven, and in 
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Table 2: Overview of the three networks 
Appendix A: List of tables  
Table 1 The survey response rate  
Table 1 provides a general overview of the survey response rate. The overview is based on the 
responses from members of NCE Finance Innovation and external actors (non-members). 
Table 1 The survey response rate 
  
Table 2 Descriptions of the three networks 
Table 2 provides descriptions of the three analysed and visualized networks: the organic 
network, the regional cluster network, and the maximum network. Since there are cluster 
members and relations occurring in both the organic- and the regional cluster network 
simultaneously, the “unique ties” and “nodes” occurring in the maximum network are not 










Table 4: Distribution of the cluster members’ answers to the second question in part three 
of the survey 
Table 3 Overview of fintech categories  
Table 3 describes the seven fintech categories of the members of NCE FI. 
Table 3: Overview of the fintech categories  
 
Table 4 Overview of answers to question two in part three of the survey  
Table 4 provides an overview of the responding members of NCE FI’s answers to the second 
question in part three of the survey: “To what degree do you consider your organization’s 
membership in NCE Finance Innovation cluster to be important for your company’s ability to 








Table 5 Overview of answers to question three in part three of the 
survey 
Table 5 provides an overview of the responding members of NCE FI’s answers to the third 
question in part three of the survey: “In order to establish a collaborative partnership with 
another organization in the cluster, how often does your organization first go through NCE 
Finance Innovation cluster?” 
Table 5: Distribution of the regional cluster members’ answers to the third 
question of part three of the survey 
 
Table 6 Structural characteristics of organic and regional cluster 
network 
Table 6 shows the structural characteristics of the organic- and the regional cluster network. 
The network measures are applied to the networks as undirected.  
Table 6: Structural characteristics of the organic- and regional cluster network  
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Table 7 Average centrality scores across fintech categories 
Table 7 shows the average scores of selected network measures across the fintech categories 
in the directed and weighted regional cluster network. The column for “Benefit” shows the 
average scores from the second survey question in part three. Among the members who 
participated in the survey, no actors in the categories investment firms, academia or the 
government were represented. Their benefit score is therefore “–“ in the table.    
Table 7: Average scores based on fintech category in the regional cluster network  
 
Table 8 Burt’s constraint score in the regional cluster network 
Table 8 shows the distribution of Burt’s constraint score (BCS) for members in NCE Finance 
Innovation.  
Table 8: Burt’s constraint score in the regional cluster network 
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Table 9 Structural characteristics of the organic subnetworks   
Table 9 shows the structural characteristics of the subnetworks for each of the five relational 
types that were collected in part one of the survey. Table 9 has not been used in this thesis but 
was referred to in section 5 regarding future research.  
Table 9: The structural characteristics of the five relational types from part one in the 
survey   
   
 
Table 10 Structural characteristics of the regional cluster’s subnetworks   
Table 10 shows the structural characteristics of the subnetworks for each of the five relational 
types that were collected in part two of the survey. Table 10 is not used in this thesis but is 
referred to in section 5 regarding future research.  
Table 10: The structural characteristics of the five relational types from part two in the 





Appendix B: List of figures  
Figure 1 Maximum network   
Figure 1 illustrates the undirected and weighted maximum network. All the relations from 
both the organic- and regional cluster network are included. The green nodes represent 
members of NCE FI, while the red nodes represent actors outside the cluster. Green ties 
represent relations between two cluster members, while red ties represent relations between 
two non-members. The thickness of a tie corresponds to the relation’s assigned weight. 
Figure 1: Maximum network 
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Figure 2 Organic network    
Figure 2 illustrates the undirected and weighted organic network. The orange nodes represent 
members of NCE FI, while the purple nodes represent non-members. Orange ties represent 
relations between two cluster members, while purple ties represent relations between two non-
members. The thickness of a tie corresponds to the relation’s assigned weight.  
 
Figure 2: Organic network 
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Figure 3 Regional cluster network    
Figure 3 illustrates the directed and weighted regional cluster network of NCE Finance 
Innovation. The thickness of a tie corresponds to the relation’s assigned weight, while the 
direction of the tie is represented by the direction of the arrow.  






Figure 4 Regional cluster network 
Figure 4 shows the regional cluster network as weighted and directed. The node colour 
represents the member’s fintech category affiliation, and the node size corresponds to the 
node’s degree centrality score.  The thickness of a tie corresponds to the relation’s assigned 
weight, while the direction of the relation is represented by the direction of the arrow. 
  
Figure 4: The regional cluster network based on degree centrality and 
fintech category  
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Figure 5: The regional cluster network based on betweenness centrality 
and fintech category 
Figure 5 Regional cluster network  
Figure 5 shows the regional cluster network as weighted and directed. The node colour 
represents the member’s fintech category affiliation, while the node size corresponds to the 
node’s betweenness centrality score. The thickness of a tie corresponds to the relation’s 









Figure 6 Regional cluster network  
Figure 6 shows the regional cluster network as weighted and directed. The green nodes are 
NCE FI members with a Burt’s constraint score (BCS) below 0.15. The red nodes are cluster 
members with a BCS above 0.15. The thickness of a tie corresponds to the relation’s assigned 
weight, while the direction of the relation is represented by the direction of the arrow. 




Figure 7 Regional cluster network  
Figure 7 shows the regional cluster network as weighted and directed. The more intense green 
the node colour is, the more the actor stated that it benefits from being a member of NCE 
Finance Innovation with regards to fintech innovation (second survey question in part three). 
The node’s size corresponds to the actor’s betweenness centrality. The thickness of a tie 
corresponds to the relation’s assigned weight, while the direction of the relation is represented 
by the direction of the arrow. 

















Figure 8: The regional cluster network based on out-degree centrality and innovation benefit   
Figure 8 Regional cluster network    
Figure 8 shows the regional cluster network as weighted and directed. The more intense red 
the node colour is, the more the actor stated that it benefits from being a member of NCE 
Finance Innovation with regards to fintech innovation (second survey question in part three). 
The node size corresponds to the actor’s out-degree centrality score. The thickness of a tie 
corresponds to the relation’s assigned weight, while the direction of the relation is represented 










Figure 9 Histogram of degree distribution  
Figure 9: Histogram of NCE FI members’ degree centrality distribution 
 
Figure 10 Histogram of betweenness centrality distribution 









Appendix C: The survey  
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